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The brevity of the substantive provisions of the Sherman Act1 has
not led to simplicity or even clarity in the development of antitrust law.
From the earliest days of antitrust analysis, two general schools of
thought have competed. One reads the broad provisions of the Act in
light of common-law precedent which judged covenants in restraint of
trade by determining whether they were reasonable in relation to the ben-
efits they provided to the parties and the community.2 This school of
thought calls for the consistent application of such a "rule of reason" in
all Sherman Act cases. The Act, according to this view, did not alter the
substantive common law of trade restraints, but merely gave federal
* Associate Professor of Law, The John Marshall School of Law. B.A., 1973, Fordham
University; J.D., 1976, New York University School of Law; LL.M., 1983, Temple University
School of Law.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982). The substantive prohibitions, in their entirety, are:
Sec. 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal.
Sec. 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty
of a felony.
2. The common-law "rule of reason" test for such covenants dates back to Mitchell v.
Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (K.B. 1711). Before passage of the Sherman Act, American courts
had adopted this test as the proper way to analyze such covenants. See, e.g., Dunlap v. Greg-
ory, 10 N.Y. 241 (1851); Peterson v. Johnston Nut Co., 204 Minn. 300, 293 N.W. 561 (1939).
It continues to be the approach taken in contemporary cases attempting to enforce restrictive
covenants. See Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 28 N.Y.2d 45, 268 N.E.2d 751, 320 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1971);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 186 (1981).
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courts jurisdiction to develop the common-law rules and apply them to
businesses engaged in interstate commerce.
3
The opposing view sees the Sherman Act as a tightening of com-
mon-law rules. This view emphasizes the plain language of the Act,
which avoids any use of terms such as "unreasonable" in defining illegal
conduct, and the strong antimonopoly sentiment which gave rise not
only to the Sherman Act but to most subsequent legislation dealing with
the problem of firms with market power.4 Advocates of this position
have called for unambiguous and consistent condemnation of practices
seen as restraints of trade. The earliest substantive antitrust decision of
the Supreme Court, United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association,5
endorsed this view that the Sherman Act altered the substantive law of
restraint of trade, making all such restraints, not just those found "unrea-
sonable," illegal.
6
Those arguing against the consistent use of the rule of reason have
always been somewhat at a disadvantage. Although their alternative of
3. [Senator Sherman] stated on several occasions that the object of the bill was to
make the common law against monopolies and restraint of trade applicable on the
federal level. The common law as it had been applied in Britain and in the several
states was to be the main guide of the national courts in drawing the line of demarca-
tion betveen lawful and unlawful combinations.
H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 183, 228-29 (1955).
4. Early histories of the Sherman Act show members of Congress vying with one an-
other to see whose denunciations of late nineteenth-century trusts could be more florid. See
generally A. WALKER, HISTORY OF THE SHERMAN ACT 1-46 (1910). In adopting an amend-
ment to Senator Sherman's original bill, "the Senate expressed its purpose to regulate interna-
tional and interstate commerce, in such thorough detail as to prohibit every combination of
capital, skills or acts which might be made for the purpose of securing unity of action between
previous competitors." Id. at 24. Writing in 1910, Walker concluded that § I of the Act was
meant to exclude only those restraints which had trivial effects on "public or private welfare."
Id. at 56 (emphasis added). In the language of modem debate about the purpose of the Act,
Walker seems to say that it was meant to protect both competition ("public welfare") and
competitors ("private welfare").
5. 166 U.S. 290 (1897). The Court had dealt with the Sherman Act earlier, in United
States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), but only to the extent of ruling that, within the
confines of late nineteenth-century constitutional jurisprudence, manufacturing was not "inter-
state commerce" and, therefore, not within the scope of the Sherman Act.
6. The Court stated:
A contract may be in restraint of trade and still be valid at common law. Although
valid, it is nevertheless a contract in restraint of trade.... When, therefore, the body
of an act pronounces as illegal every contract or combination in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, etc., the plain and ordinary meaning of such
language is not limited to that kind of contract alone which is in unreasonable re-
straint of trade, but all contracts are included in such language, and no exception or
limitation can be added without placing in the act that which has been omitted by
Congress. r
Trans-Missouri, 166 U.S. at 328.
[Vol. 38
absolute condemnation holds, as one of its principal attractions, the
promise of simplicity and clarity, a rule condemning all acts belonging to
a certain class does not eliminate the need for analysis. It merely shifts
the crucial point in the analysis to the decision whether the specific act in
question belongs to the illegal class. And when the term used to describe
the illegal activity also, in some sense, describes activity clearly not
meant to be condemned, the decision whether to apply the clear and ab-
solute rule may become so unclear and qualified as to make the utility of
the absolute condemnation questionable, if not illusory. For example,
C6restraint of trade," given its literal meaning, describes all contracts.
Every contract limits the freedom of the contracting parties and is meant
to give them some advantage over others. When Justice Peckham wrote
in Trans-Missouri that the Sherman Act condemns all restraints of trade,
he must have had a more limited definition of the term in mind.
It was not a Supreme Court decision, but rather an opinion by the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals which first gave some definition to the
activity unconditionally condemned in Trans-Missouri. In United States
v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,7 Judge Taft drew a distinction between
''contracts in which the covenant in restraint of trade was ancillary to the
main and lawful purpose of the contract, and was necessary to the pro-
tection of the covenantee in the carrying out of that main purpose,"
which might be upheld under the rule of reason, and "contracts having
for their sole object the restraint of trade." It was the latter type of
agreement that would always be an illegal restraint of trade under the
Sherman Act. As early as Addyston Pipe, then, it was clear that rigorous
and absolute antitrust prohibitions did not eliminate the need for analysis
of a particular agreement. On the contrary, absolute condemnation was
possible only after a determination that the agreement had been properly
classified.
In 1911, the Supreme Court explicitly adopted the rule of reason as
the basic tool of antitrust analysis. Chief Justice White, who had dis-
sented from the Court's hard line in Trans-Missouri, wrote for the Court
7. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
8. Id. at 283. Judge Taft expressed skepticism about the wisdom of too flexible a rule:
It is true that there are some cases in which the courts ... have set sail on a sea of
doubt, and have assumed the power to say, in respect to contracts which have no
other purpose and no other consideration on either side than the mutual restraint of
the parties, how much restraint is in the public interest, and how much is not.
The manifest danger in the administration of justice according to so shifting,
vague, and indeterminate a standard would seem to be a strong reason against adopt-
ing it.
Id. at 283-84.
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in Standard Oil v. United States :9
And as the contracts or acts embraced in [the Sherman Act] were not
expressly defined, since the enumeration addressed itself simply to
classes of acts, those classes being broad enough to embrace every con-
ceivable contract or combination which could be made concerning
trade or commerce... it inevitably follows that the provision necessar-
ily called for the exercise of judgment which required that some stan-
dard should be resorted to for the purpose of determining whether the
prohibitions contained in the statute had or had not in any given case
been violated .... [I]t follows that it was intended that the standard of
reason which had been applied at the common law and in this country
... was intended to be the measure used .... 10
Although it could be argued that Standard Oil was entirely consis-
tent with earlier cases and did no more than elaborate on the common-
law framework set forth by Judge Taft in Addyston Pipe, the reaction to
Standard Oil was nonetheless sharp. Most saw it as a rejection of the
stringent attitude of Trans-Missouri and a victory for corporate interests,
even though the defendant was found to have violated the rule of reason.
Calls arose for new legislation providing tighter and clearer antitrust re-
strictions. The Clayton Act of 1914,12 which focused on particular prac-
tices and at least appeared to require special scrutiny for those practices,
was largely a response to such demands.13 It was soon evident, however,
that even the relatively specific provisions of the Clayton Act would be
applied only after some analysis of the anticompetitive effects of the prac-
tices at issue.
14
The rule of reason has remained the core principle of antitrust
analysis. The rule weighs the anticompetitive effects of a challenged
practice against its procompetitive effects. 15 But the indefinite nature of
9. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
10. Id. at 60.
11. The most influential proponent of the position that Standard Oil is part of a consis-
tent line of cases dating from Trans-Missouri and including Addyston Pipe is Judge Robert
Bork. The connecting thread, states Bork, is the "guiding policy" of consumer welfare. See R.
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 22-41 (1978).
12. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982)).
13. For a discussion of the genesis of both the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1982)), as "a re-
sponse to perceived inadequacies both in the substantive scope and in the enforcement of the
Sherman Act," see E. KINTER & J. BAUER, 3 FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 4-9 (1983).
14. Each of the substantive provisions of the Clayton Act (§ 2 concerning price discrimi-
nation, § 3 concerning tying arrangements and exclusive dealing agreements, § 7 concerning
mergers) prohibits that activity only when its effect "may be substantially to lessen competi-
tion." 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 14, 18 (1982). Analysis is, of course, required to establish whether the
challenged activity in each instance does threaten to do so.
15. This is a more limited inquiry than the broad common-law balancing test, which
allowed consideration of the likely injury to the public without specifically limiting the ques-
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this standard and its perceived leniency toward questionable practices
has led to persistent calls for more precise and stringent rules. These
calls usually take the form of advocating that certain types of behavior be
labelled "per se" violations of law.
The most commonly articulated arguments for labelling certain con-
duct per se illegal under the antitrust laws emphasize the costs of the
imprecision of the rule of reason. Judicial administration, it is argued, is
much simpler under a per se rule, and businessmen may plan their activ-
ity with much greater certainty. 16 Of course, such efficiency gains would
be easily outweighed if the per se concept were applied so broadly as to
inhibit conduct which might benefit the community. 17 Advocates of per
se categorization would guard against such a result by reserving the per
se label for practices shown to be invariably anticompetitive. The per se
rule would apply only to activity which would always fail rule of reason
analysis and therefore would not require its detailed application. Under
this reasoning, per se analysis is merely a more efficient way of imple-
menting the rule of reason. 8
Behind the debate over the efficiency costs of either applying or re-
jecting per se rules, there appears to be a less explicit but still obvious
clash between two general positions. The debate assumes that per se
treatment is the best, and possibly the only, way in which to enforce the
antitrust laws vigorously. To be for rigorous enforcement, then, is to
favor frequent use of per se categorizations. Conversely, the rule of rea-
son is seen as the refuge of those who would just as soon see the statutes
lie dormant or, if used at all, be applied only in the most egregiously
anticompetitive situations. To favor the rule of reason, then, is to favor
lax enforcement of the Sherman Act, and vice versa. On both levels, that
of specific analysis of the consequences of per se treatment and that of the
per se/rule of reason controversy as a forum for argument over the wis-
dom of vigorous enforcement of the statutes, the conflict has raged for
decades.
This Article argues that the defenders of per se analysis have as-
signed themselves an impossible task. Arguing that types of activity can
tion to injuries flowing from a lessening of competition. But the Supreme Court has made it
clear that the rule of reason is to be implemented by weighing only benefits and harms to
competition, rather than any broadly based benefits or harms the practice may pose to public
welfare. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).
16. The rationales favoring per se rules are set forth in Note, Fixing the Price-Fixing
Confusion: A Rule of Reason Approach, 92 YALE L.J. 706, 706-10 (1983).
17. These "invidious consequences of the per se rule" are examined in id. at 715-27.
18. Thus, per se categorization should be limited to those practices which are "notori-
ously hostile to competition." L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 196 (1977).
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be identified as invariably anticompetitive is futile; counterexamples can
almost always be put forward. Consequently, defenders of per se catego-
rization are reduced to one of two unattractive alternatives. First, they
can concede that per se categories may in some instances prohibit
procompetitive activity, but argue that the overall benefits of per se cate-
gorization justify the result. Such an argument is unsatisfying because it
explicitly sacrifices particular blameless defendants in order to search for
an increase in general welfare. Second, per se defenders can narrow their
categories to eliminate procompetitive counterexamples. This strategy,
,however, threatens to destroy those categories entirely. And if most of
the once-condemned activity is returned to the realm of the rule of rea-
son, the insight that certain types of behavior are particularly dangerous
is lost.
The solution to this dilemma is to abandon the phrase "per se ille-
gal," with its unrealistic connotations of absolute prohibition, yet retain a
stringent test for particularly suspect activity. This new test must place a
heavy burden of justification upon the defendant, yet not make justifica-
tion impossible when the defendant's activity is clearly procompetitive.
To abandon per se illegality with no alternative but rule of reason analy-
sis would be to send an unwise message of government tolerance of prac-
tices threatening competition. But an alternative approach does exist.
Rather than defend the absolutism of per se illegality, this Article
argues that antitrust analysts should adopt a rule of strict antitrust scru-
tiny. Particular practices, including those currently subject to per se
rules, should place the burden on the defendant to show first, that they
were adopted to achieve demonstrable procompetitive ends and second,
that they are narrowly tailored to achieve those ends. Unless the defend-
ant can carry this burden, these practices should be declared illegal.
Such an analysis preserves the valid insight of per se analysis that certain
types of behavior are particularly suspicious without maintaining an in-
defensible attitude of absolutism with respect to those practices.
This Article begins by sketching the history of the concept of per se
illegality: its growth from 1940 until the mid-1970s, its retreat during
the last decade, and the continuing attacks on it which threaten the exist-
ence of the concept as a form of analysis separate from rule of reason
principles. The alternative approach of strict antitrust scrutiny will then
be explained and the application of that concept to various types of anti-
trust behavior discussed. Strict antitrust scrutiny, it will be shown, is a
far better way of approaching suspect anticompetitive conduct than




I. Per Se Rules: Creation and Development
A. Expansion of the Per Se Concept: 1940-1974
(1) Horizontal Price Fixing
The term "per se" was first used to categorize antitrust violations in
1940, in United States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil Co. ' 9 Defendant oil compa-
nies had established a program under which they bought up low-priced
"distress" gasoline from independent refiners, thus maintaining higher
prices for their own products. In response to defendants' arguments that
the agreements were reasonable in the context of the Depression-era oil
market, the Court held: "Under the Sherman Act a combination formed
for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging,
or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce
is illegal per se."'20 When such an agreement was found to exist, it was
irrelevant that the defendants lacked sufficient market power to actually
achieve their goals.
21
Although Socony-Vacuum was the first case to use the term "per
se," the Court stated that forty years of precedent dealing with price-
fixing schemes had established that such schemes invariably violated the
Sherman Act. However, since the earlier cases involved agreements be-
tween defendants whose combined market shares were of near-monopoly
size,22 one could argue that only similar price-fixing agreements should
be invariably condemned.
Even disregarding the issue of market control, the Socony Court's
reference to forty years of unbroken precedent for finding price-fixing
agreements per se illegal seems disingenuous because the Court took
pains to distinguish two significant Supreme Court decisions in which
defendants were exonerated, under the rule of reason, for behavior which
19. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
20. Id. at 223.
21. This was the principal point discussed in the Court's famous "footnote 59." Id. at
224-26 n.59. Drawing not only on prior antitrust precedent, but also on general principles of
criminal law, the Court pointed out that the crime of conspiracy could be committed by de-
fendants who were incapable of actually carrying out their ultimate purpose.
22. Id. at 218. Among the most notable were United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273
U.S. 392 (1927); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). The
defendants in Trenton Potteries manufactured 82% of all United States bathroom pottery fix-
tures. 273 U.S. at 394. Although the defendants in Addyston Pipe controlled only 30% of the
overall tonnage of their product in the country, 85 F. at 279, they controlled "two-thirds of the
output" in their own region. Id. at 291-92. In Trans-Missouri, the Court stated: "It is true
that, as to a majority of those living along its line, each railroad is a monopoly." 166 U.S. at
335.
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was clearly, in some sense, price fixing. 23 In Chicago Board of Trade v.
United States, 24 the Court upheld a Board rule which froze certain grain
prices from the close of the trading day until the market opened the next
morning. Explicitly employing the rule of reason, the Court found that
the Board rule "improve[d] market conditions" by creating a more effi-
cient public market, and that the restraint "had no appreciable effect on
general market prices."'25 And in Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United
States,26 the Court upheld an arrangement whereby 137 coal producers
organized an exclusive sales agent, which would fix the price of the pro-
ducers' coal so as to eliminate "destructive trade practices."
'27
After Socony- Vacuum, however, it was easy to overlook these cases
as either having been implicitly overruled or, at most, having little or no
relevance beyond their own facts.28 For more than three decades, the
classification of horizontal price fixing as a per se violation of the Sher-
man Act was unshaken. The only important question in this area ap-
peared to be just how far the concept should extend. Any agreement
explicitly touching on price was clearly illegal; how far removed from
price an agreement could be and still constitute price fixing remained
uncertain.
29
(2) Vertical Price Fixing
Vertical price fixing, also known as resale price maintenance, is a
23. See Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 214-18.
24. 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
25. Id. at 240. Essentially, held the Court, the rule was a device to facilitate, not impede,
market functions. By forcing disparate sellers and buyers into a coherent public market, "all
price determination was made under the most public and competitive of circumstances." H.
HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 120-21 (1985). Professor
Hovenkamp notes that some scholarship has cast doubt on whether these were the actual,
primary motives of the members of the Board of Trade. It has been argued that the rule may
have been a device for maintaining fixed brokerage commissions by discouraging "cheating"
by brokers on sales away from the public market. See Zerbe, The Chicago Board of Trade
Case, 1918, 5 REs. L. & ECON. 17 (1983).
26. 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
27. Id. at 359.
28. Appalachian Coals was, of course, decided during the depths of the Depression, when
legislative approaches to economic questions turned away from competitive markets and to-
ward encouraging, if not enforcing, cooperation. It can be maintained, then, that the case has
no relevance outside of such a drastic situation, "where Congress has expressly or impliedly
pointed in other legislation to a relevant goal other than competition." L. SULLIVAN, supra
note 18, at 182.
29. For example, agreements to standardize product quality can be considered price fix-
ing, see National Macaroni Mfrs. Ass'n v. FTC, 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965), as might an
agreement to limit the manner in which prices are advertised. See United States v. Gasoline
Retailers Ass'n, 285 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1961); United States v. Nu-Phonics, Inc., 1979-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 62,652 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
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practice by which a manufacturer controls the price at which his buyer
will later resell at the wholesale or retail level. The Supreme Court first
condemned vertical price fixing in the 1911 case of Dr. Miles Medical Co.
v. John D. Park & Sons Co. 30 Although the Court did not use the term
"per se," neither did it employ rule of reason balancing. Rather, the
Court simply held that "agreements or combinations between dealers,
having for their sole purpose the destruction of competition and the fix-
ing of prices, are injurious to the public interest and void."
31
This rule of invariable illegality for resale price maintenance agree-
ments did not meet with the nearly unanimous approval accorded the
similar treatment of agreements between competitors. The Miller-Tyd-
ings Act of 193732 and the subsequent McGuire Act 33 permitted states
to, in effect, opt out of the national rule prohibiting resale price agree-
ments, and many states did so. However, general dissatisfaction with the
effects of legal vertical price fixing led to the repeal of those statutes in
1975; at that point, it was held, the "per se" rule of Dr. Miles was re-
stored nationwide. 34
(3) Horizontal Market Division
While price fixing between competitors eliminates price competition
between them, it does not necessarily eliminate all competition between
the parties to the agreement. Price fixers can continue to compete with
respect to other aspects of the sale. When competitors carve out parts of
a market and assign them to a particular seller, however, all competition
between the conspirators is at an end. It would seem to follow that, if
30. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
31. Id. at 408. The Court drew heavily upon common-law precedents dealing with re-
straints on alienation of property.
32. Pub. L. No. 314, 50 Stat. 693, repealed by Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975,
Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801.
33. Pub. L. No. 542, 66 Stat. 631 (1952), repealed by Consumer Goods Pricing Act of
1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801. The McGuire Act closed a large loophole in the
original Miller-Tydings scheme. Miller-Tydings permitted states to permit voluntary agree-
ments fixing resale prices, but it did not authorize states to compel retailers, aside from the
terms of their own agreements, to adhere to manufacturers' resale prices. See Schwegman
Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951). Large retailers who wished to cut
prices, who were precisely the retailers at whom the Miller-Tydings Act was aimed, could
avoid its effect by using their bargaining power and simply refusing to accede to contractual
price agreements. The McGuire Act permitted states to adopt systems whereby a manufac-
turer's agreement with one dealer concerning resale prices would bind not only that dealer, but
all dealers within that state.
34. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984). Of course, even
prior to repeal of the Miller-Tydings Act, the per se rule was applied to resale price mainte-
nance schemes not protected by state law. See, e.g., Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13
(1964).
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price fixing between competitors is per se illegal, then market division
among competitors would be similarly condemned.
3 5
A number of earlier cases found per se violations in schemes that
included aspects of horizontal market division. These schemes, however,
were usually accompanied by price-fixing agreements. 3 6 Until 1972, it
could be argued that horizontal market division was per se illegal only
when accompanied by more direct price restraints. Then, in United
States v. Topco Associates,37 the Supreme Court held that a system of
exclusive territories set up by a cooperative association of small super-
market chains, unaccompanied by any agreement concerning prices, was
per se illegal.38 The Court rejected arguments that the defendants lacked
sufficient market power to make the restraint truly anticompetitive, and
that the defendants actually needed the territorial arrangement to com-
pete successfully with the larger supermarket chains. In a footnote, the
Court defended not only the application of the per se rule to the case, but
also the idea of per se treatment itself:
Without the per se rules, businessmen would be left with little to aid
them in predicting in any particular case what courts will find to be
legal and illegal under the Sherman Act. Should Congress ultimately
determine that predictability is unimportant in this area of the law, it
can, of course, make per se rules inapplicable in some or all cases, and
leave courts free to ramble through the wilds of economic theory in
order to maintain a flexible approach. 39
(4) Vertical Market Division
As late as 1963, the Supreme Court refused to classify vertical mar-
ket division as a per se violation of the Sherman Act.40 Arguments that
35. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 18, at 224-29. On the other hand, market division
presents unique problems of implementation. Some markets may not lend themselves to terri-
torial divisions, and such schemes are often more obvious than price fixing. See H.
HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, at 88-89.
36. E.g., United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v.
United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th
Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). In at least one early case, a scheme arguably constitut-
ing a division of markets was upheld under the rule of reason. National Ass'n of Window
Glass Mfrs. v. United States, 263 U.S. 403 (1923).
37. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
38. Id. at 608. The basic purpose of the association was to create sufficient scale econo-
mies to permit Topco "private-label" products to compete with similar products available at
national supermarket chains. Id. at 599 n.3.
39. Id. at 609-10 n.10. After the invalidation of Topco's territorial restrictions, the com-
pany implemented a less rigid system of "areas of primary responsibility" enforced by "profit
pass-over" provisions which was upheld against the government's antitrust challenge. United
States v. Topco Assocs., 1973-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 74,485 (N.D. Ill.), aff'dper curiam, 414
U.S. 801 (1973).
40. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). The case was not a strong
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38
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such agreements between manufacturers and dealers limiting the dealers'
freedom could be procompetitive, at least when used by firms without
substantial market power, caused the Court to hesitate before extending
the per se rule to these types of restraints. But four years later, vertical
market division joined the list of practices held to be invariably illegal.
In United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,41 the Court held that a
system of customer and territorial restraints imposed by a manufacturer
on wholesalers and retailers was per se illegal. Once title had passed to
the buyer, "[s]uch restraints are so obviously destructive of competition
that their mere existence" should constitute a violation.42 As with the
horizontal market restrictions in Topco, the possibility that nonprice re-
straints on firms downstream in the distribution chain might indeed pro-
mote interbrand competition was not permitted to offset the obvious
elimination of intrabrand competition among the manufacturer's dealers.
(5) Boycotts
Courts and commentators have often noted that the per se rule
prohibiting concerted refusals to deal is the most difficult to enunciate
with clarity. It has long been obvious that not every agreement to with-
hold some form of contract with another is per se illegal. Sometimes
such boycotts are held to be legal;4 3 on other occasions they are invali-
dated only after rule of reason analysis. 44
Since 1959, however, it has been clear that certain types of boycotts
are per se illegal. In Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,45 the
Court found a Sherman Act violation in a conspiracy organized by a
department store chain to pressure appliance manufacturers to cut off a
competing retailer. In reaching its decision, the Court did not require
proof of specific adverse effects on the market, or of the market power
possessed by the boycotters. "Group boycotts, or concerted refusals by
endorsement of rule of reason treatment of such agreements. Rather, the Court held that it
lacked sufficient experience with vertical territorial restrictions to decide whether per se treat-
ment would be appropriate. Three Justices dissented, arguing for affirmance of the district
court's application of the per se rule. Id. at 275 (Clark, J., dissenting).
41. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
42. Id. at 379.
43. See, e.g., Alpha-Sentura Business Servs., Inc. v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 1979-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 62,960 (D. Md. 1979) (permitting a concerted refusal of credit card companies
to deal with "adult" book stores).
44. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding certain
aspects of the National Football League's college draft, under which all teams not holding
draft rights to a college player will not negotiate for that player's services, to be illegal under
rule of reason analysis).
45. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
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traders to deal with other traders," stated the Court, "have long been
held to be in the forbidden [per se] category.
'46
At least that type of boycott presented in Klor's, directed at the busi-
ness relationships maintained by a competitor, is a per se violation. Con-
certed activity intended to deprive a competitor of a desired trade
relationship will be found invariably anticompetitive, or at least invaria-
bly lacking in positive effects. No rule of reason analysis is necessary.
(6) Tying Arrangements
Tying arrangements 47 are illegal, as violations not only of the Sher-
man Act, but also of section 3 of the Clayton Act.48 It has long been
obvious, however, that the per se rule with respect to tying arrangements
is, in at least one respect, quite different from other per se rules: the tying
arrangement is a per se violation only if the defendant has some sort of
market power.
The prohibition against tying arrangements has always focused on
the coercion of the buyer by the seller 49 to take an unwanted second
product.50 If the buyer purchases both in the absence of coercion, how-
46. Id. at 212. The Court cited several cases in which such boycotts were treated harshly,
but without the explicit use of per se language or evidence of actual market impact, including
Eastern States Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914); Fashion Origina-
tors' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1
(1958). Klor's, 359 U.S. at 212 n.5.
47. A tying arrangement is an "agreement by a party to sell one product but only on the
condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product." Northern Pac. Ry. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982). The section prohibits the sale of any commodity "on the
condition, agreement, or understanding that the... purchaser thereof shall not deal in the...
commodities of a competitor... [of the] seller." While a tie-in is not an explicit agreement not
to purchase from a competitor, as is a requirements contract, the practical effect of precluding
a competitor from a sale of the tied product is sufficient to fall within the statute.
49. Although § 3 deals only with the actions of a seller or lessor of two products, it is
possible for a buyer to violate § 1 of the Sherman Act by analogous coercive activity, referred
to as coercive reciprocity. In such a case, a buyer with purchasing power, rather than the
power created by its own products, coerces a seller by conditioning his purchases of the seller's
product on the seller's purchase of goods or services provided by the buyer. See L. SULLIVAN,
supra note 18, at 492-95. While there is far less case law on such arrangements than there is on
traditional ties, there is authority that such cases should be analyzed just as Clayton Act cases
are, with liability depending upon a showing of economic power in one market, and a not
insubstantial amount of commerce in the other. See Betaseed, Inc. v. U & I, Inc., 681 F.2d
1203 (9th Cir. 1982).
50. Our cases have concluded that the essential characteristic of an invalid tying
arrangement lies in the seller's exploitation of its control over the tying product to
force the buyer into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not want
at all, or might have preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms.
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 38
ever, there can be no anticompetitive effect; such a result is evidence of
no more than the exercise of consumer choice. To demonstrate coercion,
it is necessary to show that the seller has some type of market power in
one (the "tying") product.5 1 Such market power can be demonstrated
either by market share52 or by demonstrating that the product is in some
way uniquely desirable.
5 3
If the central feature distinguishing per se violations from rule of
reason cases is that the former can be committed regardless of the market
power of the defendant,: 4 then tying arrangements are either per se in
name only, or the phrase is being used much differently than the way in
which it is used elsewhere. In any event, by the late 1970s it was estab-
lished that conditioning the sale of one product on the purchase of an-
other is a per se violation when the seller has market power in the former
and a not insignificant amount of commerce is involved with respect to
the latter product.55
(7) Other Cases
Although the six categories listed above were the only ones specifi-
cally labelled as per se antitrust violations, the appeal of the per se con-
cept was evident elsewhere in Sherman and Clayton Act decisions. For
example, in striking down mergers as violating section 7 of the Clayton
51. Id. at 12-13. Although the cases usually speak of the requirement of market power in
the tying product as being indistinguishable from "coercion," some have stated that the two
are separate elements of the offense. See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, at 214-15.
52. See, e.g., Moore v. James H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207 (9th Cir. 1977).
53. "In short, the question is whether the seller has some advantage not shared by his
competitors in the market for the tying product." United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters.,
429 U.S. 610 (1977). Prior to Fortner, the mere fact that a product was unique was often
thought sufficient, and courts accordingly found that patented, copyrighted, or trademarked
goods, because of their legal status, had sufficient power to satisfy this requirement. See, e.g.,
United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43
(9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972). Such decisions were often criticized on the
grounds that legal monopolies do not necessarily create economic monopolies or even eco-
nomic power, since, for example, one patented or trademarked product may be considered by
consumers to be a perfectly acceptable substitute for another. See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note
25, at 218-19. Recently, courts have shown some tendency to question whether the patent or
copyright at issue confers actual competitive advantage. See, e.g., In re Data Gen. Corp. Anti-
trust Litig., 490 F. Supp. 1089 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
54. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
55. The requirement of a not insubstantial amount of commerce in the tied product is a
much easier element to establish than is market power in the tying product. It must be estab-
lished that "a total amount of business, substantial enough in terms of dollar-volume so as not
to be merely de minimis, is foreclosed to competitors by the tie." Fortner Enters. v. United
States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 501 (1969). As little as $50,000 worth of business in the tied
product has been found sufficient. Aamco Automatic Transmissions v. Taylor, 407 F. Supp.
430 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
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Act, the Court became so deferential to the government, at least in cases
involving the merger of actual competitors, that it appeared to adopt, at
least implicitly, a per se rule against any merger of competitors who had
significant market shares.
56
In United States v. Container Corp. ofAmerica, 57 the Supreme Court
invalidated a system of information exchange between defendants con-
cerning their prices. The Court's language was interpreted by some as a
declaration that such exchanges were per se violations, at least when un-
dertaken by a group which, in the aggregate, possessed market power.5 8
In the early 1970s, traditional per se rules were applied against members
of the learned professions for the first time. The decisions came as a
shock to most professionals, who had long believed that their self-regula-
tion of colleagues and concerted activity regarding pricing of their serv-
ices were exempt from the antitrust laws, or at least entitled to
deferential treatment.59 Finally, decisions under the Robinson-Patman
Act,60 which prohibits anticompetitive price discrimination by sellers of
commodities, set such low thresholds for finding anticompetitive effects
61
that they could be interpreted as a movement toward a per se rule for
violations of the Act.
B. The Retreat of the Per Se Concept: 1974-1986
During the late 1970s, the expansion of the application of per se
rules came to an abrupt halt. Indeed, the concept itself came under at-
56. The high-water mark of § 7 enforcement against horizontal mergers was United
States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966), in which a merger of the two most successful
grocery chains in a deteriorating market, which would have resulted in the new firm having a
market share of about 7.5%, was held illegal. The dissenters saw this as a reflection of a
"startling per se rule." Id. at 283 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
57. 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
58. Lower court cases which cited Container Corp. as a per se case included Mowrey v.
Standard Oil Co., 463 F. Supp. 762 (N.D. Ohio 1976); Schnapps Shops, Inc. v. H.W. Wright
& Co., 377 F. Supp 570 (D. Md. 1973); United States v. FMC Corp., 306 F. Supp. 1106 (E.D.
Pa. 1969). But in his concurring opinion in Container Corp., Justice Fortas specifically stated
his understanding that the Court did not adopt a per se prohibition. 393 U.S. at 338-39 (For-
tas, J., concurring). Sullivan thought that "the case ... leaves the law in doubt." L. SULLI-
VAN, supra note 18, at 272.
59. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Goldfarb
v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
60. Pub. L. No. 692, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1982)). This is § 2
of the Clayton Act.
61. For example, in Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967), the
Court found price discrimination to satisfy the statutory requirement of posing probable injury
to competition despite the fact that the market in question appeared to be more competitive
after the price discrimination had occurred, and business was diverted away from a firm that
had previously been a local monopolist.
tack. The boundaries of most per se categories narrowed, and for the
first time a category of behavior once designated per se illegal was re-
turned to the realm of the rule of reason.
The first indications of the contraction of per se rules came at their
fringes. Types of behavior thought by many to be very nearly per se
illegal, although they had never been so designated, no longer were inva-
riably invalidated. In United States v. General Dynamics Corp. ,62 the
Supreme Court held that a merger between competitors with very large
shares in the coal market did not violate the Clayton Act. In marked
contrast to prior merger decisions, the Court went far beyond the market
shares involved to investigate the particular effect the merger would have
on the relevant market.63 The Court concluded that the unique charac-
teristics of the coal market made the high market shares involved in the
merger deceptive, and not valid evidence that the merger would injure
competition." 4 The days when merger jurisprudence could be summed
up with the statement "the government always wins" 65 were clearly over.
The rule of reason, although never explicitly abandoned in merger cases,
was reaffirmed as the appropriate standard of analysis for even the most
suspect of such cases.
The contraction of the per se approach became more apparent in
lower courts' refusal to abandon the rule of reason. Despite the stringent
language of the Supreme Court in Container Corp.,66 lower courts did not
respond by applying per se analysis to programs in which competitors
exchanged price information. Container Corp. was interpreted as contin-
uing the use of the rule of reason in such cases. 67 Similarly, lower courts
refused to read Supreme Court decisions involving the Robinson-Patman
Act harshly. Rather, they imposed strict standards of proof on plaintiffs
who alleged that systems of price discrimination threatened to harm
62. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
63. "In this case, the District Court assessed the evidence of the 'structure, history and
probable future' of the coal industry, and on the basis of this assessment found no substantial
probability of anticompetitive effects from the merger." Id. at 498.
64. The Court based its decision primarily on three "clear and significant developments
in the industry." First, coal was losing its ability to compete with other energy sources; sec-
ond, electric utilities had become clearly the most significant consumers of coal; and third "and
most significantly," almost all coal purchased by utilities was sold under long-term require-
ments contracts. Id. at 498-99. The high market share of coal sold thus did not reflect a high
degree of control over price or demand.
65. To Justice Stewart, that statement was " [t]he sole consistency ... in litigation under
§ 7." United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
66. United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969); see supra notes 57-59
and accompanying text.
67. See Comment, Antitrust Liability for an Exchange of Price Information- What Hap-
pened to Container Corporation?, 63 VA. L. RFv. 639 (1977).
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competition. 68 This retreat from broad application of the per se concept
has not been limited to the periphery of prior use of that concept. Even
the most firmly established per se categories have been reexamined.
(1) Horizontal Price Fixing
Although the rule of per se illegality for horizontal price fixing re-
mains in force, the way in which that rule is viewed was seriously altered
by the Supreme Court's 1979 decision in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Colum-
bia Broadcasting System. 69 In that case, the Court refused to find the use
of "blanket licenses" by the major associations of music copyright own-
ers to be per se illegal price fixing.
70
The Court held the per se rule inapplicable, although it found that
the defendants' activity was "price-fixing in the literal sense: the com-
posers and publishing houses ... joined together into an organization
that sets its price for the blanket license[s] it [sold]."' 71 The Court rea-
soned that price fixing in its literal sense is not necessarily price fixing of
the kind invariably condemned by the Sherman Act. Even though com-
petitors had a hand in setting prices, the Court found unique features of
the blanket license system which indicated that the program might have
redeeming competitive virtues:72 it was created to ensure that copyright
owners would be compensated efficiently for the use of their works,73 it
68. For example, some courts have interpreted Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co.,
386 U.S. 685 (1967), discussed supra note 61, to require a showing that prices are not only
discriminatory but also below cost to support a "primary line injury" case, that is, a case in
which the competitive harm is to competitors of the seller. See cases collected in ABA ANTI-
TRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 231-34 (2d ed. 1984).
69. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
70. Holders of the blanket license have
the right to perform any and all of the compositions owned by the [association's]
members or affiliates as often as the licensees desire for a stated term. Fees for blan-
ket licenses are usually a percentage of total revenues or a flat dollar amount, and do
not directly depend on the amount or type of music used.
Id. at 5.
71. Id. at 8. However, the Court stated that
this is not a question simply of determining whether two or more potential competi-
tors have literally "fixed" a "price." As generally used in the antitrust field, "price
fixing" is a shorthand way of describing certain categories of business behavior to
which the perse rule has been held applicable. ... Literalness is overly simplistic and
often overbroad.
Id. at 8-9.
72. Per se treatment, according to the Court, should be limited to practices " 'plainly
anticompetitive' and very likely without 'redeeming virtue.'" Id. at 9.
73. Id. at 20-21. The Court noted that ASCAP had been organized "because those who
performed copyrighted music for profit were so numerous and widespread, and most perform-
ances so fleeting, that as a practical matter it was impossible for the many individual copyright
owners to negotiate with and license the users and to detect unauthorized uses." Id. at 4-5.
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created something which was, in itself, a valuable new product desired by
many purchasers, 74 and the alternative of negotiating separate licenses
with the individual copyright owners was available for any purchaser
who desired it.
75
In essence, the Court restated the Socony- Vacuum definition of per
se price fixing: an agreement with the purpose and effect of stabilizing
prices. 76 But the Court was uncharacteristically willing to entertain the
argument that literal price fixing could be adopted for procompetitive
purposes and have no anticompetitive effect. In such a case, it would not
be the type of activity invariably condemned by the Sherman Act.
Reaction to Broadcast Music was sharp. Although some went so far
as to characterize it as overruling Socony- Vacuum ,77 most saw the deci-
sion not as an abandonment of the per se concept, but as a serious re-
thinking of its application. Per se analysis did not make all questions
concerning the purpose and effect of a challenged restraint irrelevant;
instead, it shifted the point at which those questions were asked. The
procompetitive effects of behavior would now be examined, not as an
argument to justify price fixing, but rather to determine whether the be-
havior at issue really was price fixing. This initial question, while still
less broad than full rule of reason analysis, 78 certainly appeared to make
the supposedly simple matter of the application of per se rules into some-
thing akin to a "mini-rule of reason."
'79
In 1982, the Court appeared to reverse direction once again. In Ari-
zona v. Maricopa County Medical Society,80 the Court considered an
agreement by members of a medical society which set maximum fees the
members could claim for services provided to policyholders of certain
74. "The blanket license is composed of the individual compositions plus the aggregating
service. Here, the whole is truly greater than the sum of its parts: it is, to some extent, a
different product." Id. at 21-22.
75. Id. at 11.
76. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940); see supra notes
19-29 and accompanying text.
77. See Note, Maricopa County and the Problem of Per Se Characterization in Horizon-
tal Price-Fixing Cases, 18 VAL. U.L. REV. 1007, 1012 n.28 (1984) ("Broadcast Music was
thought to have tacitly overruled in part the Court's holding in Socony- Vacuum.").
78. At least in theory, per se analysis is unconcerned with the market power of defend-
ants, a subject which can be enormously difficult and time-consuming to litigate. This is not to
say, of course, that matters touching on the defendant's market power will not creep into the
per se analysis of the defendant's "purpose and effect." See generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note
18, at 192-97.
79. The term is used in L. SCHWARTZ, J. FLYNN & H. FIRsT, FREE ENTERPRISE AND
ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION: ANTITRUST 360 (6th ed. 1983).
80. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
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insurance plans. 81 The defendants contended that the agreement
amounted to price fixing only in the literal, rather than the legal, sense of
the term. 82 As in Broadcast Music, the price-fixing aspects of the agree-
ment were merely ancillary to the procompetitive aims of the Society,
specifically, to create an efficient system of delivering a desirable product,
the sponsored insurance plan.
83
Somewhat surprisingly, in light of Broadcast Music, the Court re-
jected the argument and held the arrangement per se illegal.84 The Court
found this agreement "fundamentally different" from that considered in
Broadcast Music, primarily because the members of the Society did not,
by virtue of their agreement, create a new product, but merely affected
the price of a preexisting product, whether defined as medical care or
insurance.85 Not only the dissenters, but also many commentators,86
found the distinction less than persuasive. Some thought that Maricopa
was merely an aberration, a throwback to pre-Broadcast Music attitudes,
which would soon be seen as unimportant.87 Others went to the other
extreme, and speculated that Maricopa represented a return to the main-
stream of Sherman Act jurisprudence. It was Broadcast Music, in this
view, which was the aberration. 88
81. Id. at 335. The plans involved were those approved by the foundation established by
the Society. "To obtain this approval the insurers ... agree to pay the doctors' charges up to
the scheduled amounts, and in exchange the doctors agree to accept those amounts as pay-
ments in full for their services." Id. at 341.
82. Id. at 355. The Society also argued, more broadly, that the per se rule should not be
applied to an agreement to fix maximum prices Id. at 342-48.
83. The Society contended the plan made possible "a uniquely desirable form of insur-
ance coverage .... The features of the foundation-endorsed insurance plans that they stressed
were a choice of doctors, complete insurance coverage, and lower premiums." Id. at 351.
84. Id. at 356-57.
85. "The members of the foundations sell medical services. Their combination does not
permit them to sell any different product. Their combination has merely permitted them to
sell their services to certain customers at fixed prices and arguably to affect the prevailing
market price of medical care." Id. at 356 (footnote omitted). Broadcast Music was also distin-
guished on the grounds that, in that case, individual composers retained the right to negotiate
individual licensing agreements for their own compositions. The arrangement in Maricopa
restrained each doctor in his individual price negotiations. This was not, then, the establish-
ment of a valid joint venture, but rather an agreement "among independent competing entre-
preneurs." Id. at 357.
86. See, e.g., Gerhart, The Supreme Court and Antitrust Analysis: The (Near) Triumph of
the Chicago School, 1982 Sup. CT. REv. 319, 319-20 ("[I]n Arizona v. Maricopa County Medi-
cal Society, the Court missed a significant opportunity to complete its methodological frame-
work, and in doing so, made antitrust analysis once again confused and haphazard."); Note,
supra note 16, at 722 ("In sum, there is no principled way to distinguish Maricopa from Broad-
cast Music.").
87. This position could draw support from the fact that Maricopa was a 4-3 decision.
88. See, e.g., Note, supra note 77, at 1051 (The decision was a "[r]evitalization of Socony-
Vacuum and repudiation of Broadcast Music.").
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While Maricopa was a clear indication that the age of per se analysis
is not over,89 it did not put an end to the changes in the application of
that analysis. This was clearly demonstrated in NCAA v. Board of Re-
gents of the University of Oklahoma ,9 in which the Court considered a
plan under which member colleges marketed television rights to their
football games. The Association set the price for such sales, limited the
"production" of the product by limiting the number of televised games,
and prohibited member schools from independently selling television
rights to their own games. The Court found the plan illegal under rule of
reason analysis, rather than under the per se test usually applied to price
fixing and restrictions on output.91
The Court found that it was dealing with "an industry in which
horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be
available at all." 92 Any type of league sport requires some sort of agree-
ment among the competing members of the league as to how their "prod-
uct" will be marketed. A wide range of agreements might be justifiable
in such a context, and antitrust analysis should consider the league's ar-
guments in justification of the restraints. The Court's definition of its
holding in Broadcast Music was "that a joint selling arrangement may be
so efficient that it will increase sellers' aggregate output and thus be
procompetitive. ' ' 93 Defendants must, at least in some cases, be given the
opportunity to establish that the challenged arrangement is such a case.
The proposition that horizontal price fixing is per se illegal remains
the law. But our understanding of that statement has undergone serious
change in the last decade. It is now more clear than ever that the process
of categorizing conduct as price fixing may allow defendants to raise ar-
guments which cannot be raised to justify a practice already character-
ized as price fixing. Maricopa and other cases indicate that the Court has
not exactly become permissive with respect to this classic type of re-
straint,94 but the rule against it is no longer as rigid as it once was, or at
least was once thought to be.
89. "We have not wavered in our enforcement of the per se rule against price fixing."
Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 347.
90. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
91. Id. at 100, 103.
92. Id. at 101.
93. Id. at 103.
94. See Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980). In Catalano, the
Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and applied a per se test to invali-
date an agreement by beer wholesalers to eliminate short-term credit given to retailers. The
Ninth Circuit had accepted the defense that the long-run effect of such a move would be
procompetitive in eliminating an entry barrier to potential market participants. Id. at 645.
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(2) Verticql Price Fixing
As a result of the decades of "fair trade" legislation, 95 fewer signifi-
cant cases have dealt with agreements fixing resale prices than with price-
fixing agreements by competitors. Since the 1975 repeal of the Miller-
Tydings Act, the Supreme Court has held to its position that vertical, as
well as horizontal, price fixing is subject to per se prohibition. Despite
urgings by the Solicitor General, as amicus curiae, the Court recently
refused to reconsider the per se status of resale price maintenance in
Monsanto Corp. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.96 In a footnote, the Court
rested its refusal on the failure of either party to press for such a decision
at any stage of the lawsuit.97 It is, therefore, possible to interpret Mon-
santo in two different ways. On the one hand, despite much urging,98 the
Court declined an opportunity to remove this per se prohibition. On the
other hand, it avoided a strong endorsement of present law, suggesting
that, if faced squarely with the issue in the future, it might respond favor-
ably to arguments against per se treatment for resale price maintenance.
Nevertheless, as with horizontal price fixing, the Court has nar-
rowed somewhat the definition of the offense while retaining its per se
illegality. The most significant problem in classifying a practice as resale
price maintenance has been distinguishing illegal agreements from per-
missible unilateral refusals to deal by sellers. Under the longstanding
Colgate doctrine,99 a seller may state that he will not deal with any buyer
who resells at a price other than that suggested by the seller, but he may
not go further, either by extracting an actual commitment by the buyer
95. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
96. 465 U.S. 752, reh'g denied, 466 U.S. 994 (1984).
97. The Solicitor General . . . and several other amici suggest that we take this
opportunity to reconsider whether "contract[s] ... or conspirac[ies]" to fix resale
prices should always be unlawful. They argue that the economic effect of resale price
maintenance is little different from agreements on nonprice restrictions .... They say
that the economic objections to resale price maintenance... can be met easily in the
context of rule-of-reason analysis.
Certainly in this case we have no occasion to consider the merits of this argu-
ment. This case was tried on per se instructions to the jury. Neither party argued in
the District Court that the rule of reason should apply to a vertical price-fixing con-
spiracy, nor raised the point on appeal. In fact, neither party before this Court
presses the argument advanced by amici. We therefore decline to reach the question,
and we decide the case in the context in which it was decided below and argued here.
Id. at 761 n.7.
98. The urging came not only from the Justice Department, id., but also from many
academics. E.g., H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, at 247-65. Richard Posner goes even fur-
ther, arguing that such agreements, in the absence of horizontal pressure, should always be
permitted. See Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution:
Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981).
99. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
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to adhere to the prescribed price, or by enlisting others to maintain a
scheme of enforcement. 1°° A series of Supreme Court decisions had so
narrowly construed this Colgate exception, however, that it was nearly
useless as a guide for action by sellers and was thought by many to be
very nearly dead.101
In Monsanto, however, the Court for the first time since Colgate is-
sued an opinion which seemed to strengthen the doctrine. Although the
defendant in that case was found to have gone beyond Colgate by engag-
ing in concerted activity, the Court clearly stated that a seller could, at
least, listen to unsolicited dealer complaints about the price-cutting be-
havior of other dealers, and act on them by refusing to deal with the
price-cutters. 102 While this dictum may not extend the scope of permissi-
ble seller behavior very far, it is consistent with the Court's recent ap-
proach in applying the per se rule to cases involving horizontal price
fixing. The practice will continue to be declared per se illegal, but the
Court seems much more willing than before to consider arguments that
the particular behavior at issue should not be characterized as price fix-
ing at all.
(3) Horizontal Market Division
The rule of Topco, holding that market division by competitors is
per se illegal,103 has also remained a correct formal statement of the law.
The Supreme Court has decided no significant case of this nature since
Topco. But significant activity over the last decade in lower federal
courts indicates that the pattern evident in price-fixing cases of narrow-
ing the scope of the rule while refusing to abandon it altogether, also
prevails in market division cases.
Relatively clear-cut instances of horizontal market division, whether
100. Id. at 306-07.
101. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); United States v. Parke Davis &
Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
The FTC presented the Supreme Court with an opportunity to eliminate the Colgate doc-
trine, at least as it pertains to pressure on current, rather than prospective, dealers. The Com-
mission, in Russell Stover Candies, Inc., 100 F.T.C. 1 (1982), found illegal resale price
maintenance to exist on facts which did not go beyond the commonly understood bounds of
the Colgate exception. The Commission would have retained Colgate only for the initial selec-
tion of dealers: "It does not mean that compliance with a pricing policy in order to avoid
termination ... does not give rise to an agreement." Id. at 46-47. The Commission was
reversed by the Eighth Circuit, Russell Stover Candies, Inc. v. FTC, 718 F.2d 256 (8th Cir.
1983), which felt constrained by Colgate, and stated that only the Supreme Court could change
the doctrine.
102. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763.
103. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608-10 (1972); see supra notes 37-39
and accompanying text.
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involving territories,' °4 customers, 10 5 or types of products, 10 6 are classi-
fied as such and condemned per se. Such classification, however, is often
avoided, generally in one of two ways. First, a defendant may argue that
the restriction is minimal, far less restrictive than the clear identification
of exclusive customers or the delineation of airtight territories, and neces-
sary to bring about procompetitive results. 0 7 In such a case, the re-
straint will be held not to rise to the level of horizontal market division,
and thus will not be subject to per se treatment.
108
Second, a defendant may argue that the market division is essen-
tially vertical, rather than horizontal. If the restraint is imposed, as in
Topco, by an entity which might be seen as independent of its members,
or by a company engaged in dual distribution, 0 9 it may be classified as
either horizontal or vertical market division. From 1972 to 1977, this
classification made no practical difference, since both practices were per
se illegal. Today, however, it is of great importance. Because the Court's
approach to vertical marketing schemes has shifted, as discussed in the
following section, per se condemnation of a market division agreement
can be avoided by establishing that the challenged arrangement is essen-
tially vertical.
(4) Vertical Market Division
The most dramatic move in the recent retreat from per se analysis
involves the treatment of vertical market division. For the first-and
thus far, the only-time in the history of the Sherman Act, a class of
activity once labelled per se illegal has been returned to the realm of the
rule of reason. Ten years after Schwinn established per se treatment for
104. E.g., Pitchford v. Pepi, Inc., 531 F.2d 92 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935
(1976), on remand, 435 F. Supp. 685, 440 F. Supp 1175 (W.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd without opinion,
582 F.2d 1275 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 981 (1979).
105. E.g., United States v. Koppers Co., 652 F.2d 190 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1083 (1981).
106. E.g., SKF Indus. Inc., 94 F.T.C. 6 (1979).
107. In Dreiling Motor Co. v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 597 (D. Colo.
1985), an agreement plaintiff characterized as a horizontal division of markets was found to be
nothing more than a procompetitive agreement to cooperate in the distribution of noncompet-
ing products.
108. But rule of reason treatment does not always lead to exoneration. In Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990
(1984), the court refused to apply per se analysis to NFL restrictions on moving teams into
another team's territory, but nevertheless found the agreement illegal under rule of reason
analysis.
109. That is, one which sells both at the wholesale and retail levels, and therefore is not
only a supplier, but at least a potential competitor to its dealers. See, e.g., American Motor
Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230 (3d Cir. 1975).
[Vol. 38
STRICT ANTITRUST SCRUTINY
plans by which a manufacturer divided customers or territories among its
dealers, 1 0 the Supreme Court reversed itself in Continental TV, Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc. I"'
GTE Sylvania differed from Schwinn in at least two significant re-
spects. Unlike Schwinn, GTE Sylvania did not impose strict exclusive
territories on its dealers, but rather required that they operate only out of
locations approved by the manufacturer. 112 Most would agree that, all
else being equal, this type of restriction is less dangerous than the more
rigid division of territories or customers. 1' 3 Another distinction between
the cases was that the defendant in GTE Sylvania was a struggling com-
pany with a small market share, rather than the strong force which
Schwinn was in the bicycle market. The Ninth Circuit had focused on
these distinctions in holding that GTE Sylvania's activity should not be
classified as Schwinn-type per se market division.' 14 This approach of
narrow categorization is, of course, consistent with the Supreme Court's
treatment of other per se rules.
The Supreme Court, however, did not endorse the cautious ap-
proach of the court below, but rather explicitly overturned the rule of
Schwinn. 115 The Court found that legitimate, procompetitive reasons
often justified vertical market divisions. Such schemes might be used, for
example, to encourage dealers to engage in more vigorous competition
with other brands.1 6 Although these restrictions would, by definition,
110. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967); see supra notes 41-
42 and accompanying text.
111. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
112. Id. at 38.
113. A restriction like that in GTE Sylvania does not necessarily eliminate all intrabrand
competition: "A franchise did not constitute an exclusive territory, and Sylvania retained sole
discretion to increase the number of retailers in an area in light of the success or failure of
existing retailers in developing their market." Id. Also, "Sylvania imposed no restrictions on
the right of the franchisee to sell the products of competing manufacturers." Id. at 38 n.3.
114. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Continental TV, Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 988-97 (9th Cir. 1976),
aff'd on other grounds, 433 U.S. 36 (1977). The Court of Appeals held that Schwinn "is read-
ily distinguishable" from GTE Sylvania. Id. at 996.
115. 433 U.S. at 57-59.
116. [N]ew manufacturers and manufacturers entering new markets can use the re-
strictions in order to induce competent and aggressive retailers to make the kind of
investment of capital and labor that is often required in the distribution of products
unknown to the consumer. Established manufacturers can use them to induce retail-
ers to engage in promotional activities or to provide service and repair facilities nec-
essary to the efficient marketing of their products. Service and repair are vital for
many products, such as automobiles and major household appliances. The availabil-
ity and quality of such services affect a manufacturer's goodwill and the competitive-
ness of his product. Because of market imperfections such as the so-called "free
rider" effect, these services might not be provided by retailers in a purely competitive
March 1987]
reduce intrabrand competition, the Court held that only case-by-case
rule of reason analysis could determine whether this reduction of in-
trabrand competition would exceed any benefits gained through in-
creased interbrand competition. It was simply unclear that even airtight
territorial or customer restrictions would invariably result in net reduc-
tions in competition.' 1 7
It requires no careful analysis, then, to categorize vertical nonprice
restrictions on resale as falling within or without the realm of per se
analysis." 8 Here, the Supreme Court has gone all the way to restoring
the use of the rule of reason.
(5) Boycotts
In recent boycott cases, the Supreme Court has followed its general
approach of the last decade in dealing with per se categories. It has re-
tained the black letter rule of per se illegality, but has engaged in analysis
similar to the rule of reason when categorizing the conduct at issue.
With respect to boycotts, the Court seems more candid (or more self-
aware) of what it is doing. The Court's language now states that "certain
types" of boycotts are illegal per se. Other types, then, must be judged
under the rule of reason.
The basic identifying marks of the per se boycott continue to be
those evident in Klor's: a per se boycott is one aimed at depriving a com-
petitor of a valuable trade relationship.1 9 But the Supreme Court's most
recent boycott decision, Northwestern Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific
Stationery & Printing Co.,120 indicates that the Court will apply a high
standard in determining the value of the relationship severed by the boy-
cott. In Northwestern, the Court ruled that expulsion from a cooperative
purchasing association made up of competing stationers did not place the
victim "at a severe competitive disadvantage."' 12' To determine whether
situation, despite the fact that each retailer's benefit would be greater if all provided
the services than if none did.
Id. at 55.
117. Id.
118. The Court did leave the door open for a much narrower category of per se offenses of
this type. "[W]e do not foreclose the possibility that particular applications of vertical restric-
tions might justify per se prohibition .... .. Id. at 8. However, such rulings must await
showings of "demonstrable economic effect." Id. at 59. At the present time all nonprice verti-
cal restraints remain under the rule of reason.
119. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959); see supra notes
43-46 and accompanying text.
120. 105 S. Ct. 2613 (1985).
121. Id. at 2620 n.6. The disadvantage of expulsion was the loss of the advantages arising
from membership in the cooperative, that is, lower prices.
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a boycott will have an anticompetitive effect warranting per se condem-
nation requires an examination of market structure; the boycotters must
have "market power or unique access to a business element necessary for
effective competition to receive per se treatment."122 Despite the Court's
explicit endorsement of continued use of the per se concept as applied to
boycotts,123 it seems clear that the determination of whether a boycott in
fact falls into the per se category is approaching the complexity of full
rule of reason analysis.
Antitrust doctrine with respect to boycotts has also had to take ac-
count of the extension of limited first amendment protection to commer-
cial speech. 124 While this protection will not immunize the classic
boycott carried out for anticompetitive reasons, a court must at least con-
sider a defendant's plausible argument that the boycott is motivated by
legitimate concerns unrelated to the suppression of competition. 125 This
consideration of motive moves the classification of boycotts yet another
step closer to an analysis resembling full application of the rule of reason.
(6) Tying Arrangements
Cases involving tying arrangements have followed the general pat-
122. Id. at 2621. The Court held that "[a]t no time has [plaintiff] made a threshold show-
ing that these structural characteristics are present in this case." Id.
123. Id. at 2617. "It does not denigrate the per se approach to suggest care in applica-
tion." Id. at 2621-22.
124. Before 1975, it had been clear that "purely commercial" speech was not entitled to
first amendment protection. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Rela-
tions, 413 U.S. 376 (1973); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). But as a result of
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), and Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), it became clear that even "purely commer-
cial" speech is entitled to at least limited first amendment protection. The limited first amend-
ment test has been set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557 (1980):
In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. At the outset,
we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment.
For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful
activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental
interest [in regulation] is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must
determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest as-
serted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
Id. at 566. Although the Central Hudson test is designed to provide commercial speech with
something less than the full first amendment protection accorded to noncommercial speech,
the similarity of the four-part test to standard first amendment analysis has led some to find
the protection "virtually indistinguishable" from that accorded to noncommercial speech. Id.
at 591 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
125. See, e.g., Missouri v. National Org. for Women, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 847 (1980) (boycott of a state's merchants motivated by a desire to influence
that state's legislature to ratify the Equal Rights Amendment not a violation of the Sherman
Act).
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tern of retaining the black letter rule of per se illegality while at the same
time narrowing the scope of activity subject to the rule. It has, of
course, long been the rule that tying arrangements are per se illegal only
when the seller has market power in the tying product. 126 In this sense,
tying arrangements have always presented more difficult classification
problems than other per se violations.
In recent years, even the per se rule against tying arrangements, al-
ready somewhat narrow, has been applied less frequently. In Jefferson
Parish Hospital District v. Hyde, 127 the Court held that a thirty percent
market share was inadequate to demonstrate market power in the tying
product sufficient to trigger per se illegality. 128 Writing for the Court,
Justice Stevens emphasized that the per se rule with respect to tying ar-
rangements applies only when significant evidence, apparently apart
from market share, exists that consumers are coerced into the dual
purchase. While this "coercion" test can be seen as merely a restatement
of the requirement that the defendant be shown to have market power in
the tying product, some have seen it as a new, independent prerequisite
for establishing a per se violation. 129 In any event, Hyde is yet another
instance of the narrowing and refinement of per se categories.
Even more striking than the Court's opinion in Hyde is the concur-
ring opinion of Justice O'Connor, joined by three other Justices.
30
These Justices advocate abandoning the per se concept for tying arrange-
ments altogether. Since the per se rule for ties, unlike other per se cate-
gories, has always required examination of market power, "[t]he time has
... come to abandon the 'per se' label and refocus the inquiry on the
adverse economic effects, and the potential economic benefits, that the tie
may have."' 13 The disagreement among the Justices over the continued
use of the per se label is sharp and obvious. It is also indicative of the
extent to which per se analysis has been redefined. However, just what
practical analytical difference the choice of labels would have is not clear.
126. See supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text.
127. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
128. Id. at 26-27.
129. Professor Hovenkamp points out that the various circuit courts describe the test for
finding an illegal tying arrangement to be either a three-, four-, or five-part test, with evidence
of actual coercion one of the parts not always articulated by the courts. At the same time, even
if not separately articulated, all courts do recognize that some type of coercion must be present
to sustain a claim of an illegal tie-in. H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, at 214-15.
130. Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger joined in Justice O'Connor's
opinion. 466 U.S. at 32 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
131. Id. at 35 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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II. The Continuing Controversy over Per Se Analysis
There is little reason to believe that the dispute over the use of per se
antitrust rules is over, or that the law in this area has become settled.
Attacks on per se rules continue, drawing strength from recent judicial
opinions. While the attacks have prompted some vigorous defenses of
per se rules, 132 the momentum appears to remain with those who would
limit or eliminate per se categories, if not the entire concept of per se
antitrust illegality.
The most vigorous of the continuing attacks has been directed
against the use of per se analysis to assess vertical relationships. The
abandonment of per se treatment for vertical customer and territorial
restrictions has spurred frequent calls for rule of reason treatment of re-
sale price maintenance and tying arrangements. 133 It requires little re-
flection to recognize serious tension between rules subjecting resale price
maintenance to per se illegality and judging vertical nonprice restraints
under the rule of reason. 134 The same arguments put forward to demon-
strate that the overall effect of the latter may be, in a significant number
of cases, procompetitive may be used to defend the former as well.
In GTE Sylvania, the Supreme Court determined that a manufac-
turer's decision to allocate customers or territories might often result in
gains in interbrand competition sufficient to offset the loss of competition
among dealers in the manufacturer's brand.135 The benefits from exclu-
sive territories or customers might be an inducement to dealers to take on
a product with a weak market position, and might also encourage dealers
to provide services or advertising, secure in the knowledge that all the
goodwill-which they generate for the product will be of benefit to them
rather than to any "free rider" competitors.1 36 The use of such arrange-
ments might also allow the manufacturer to more rationally plan its mar-
132. See, e.g., Anderson, The Antitrust Consequences of Manufacturer-Suggested Retail
Prices-The Case for Presumptive Illegality, 54 WASH. L. REv. 763 (1979); Pitofsky, In De-
fense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71
GEO. L.J. 1487 (1983); Redlich, The Burger Court and the Per Se Rule, 44 ALBANY L. REV. I
(1979).
133. See, e.g., Butler, Lane & Phillips, The Futility ofAntitrust Attacks on Tie-In Sales: An
Economic and Legal Analysis, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 173 (1984).
134. This has led many, including the Solicitor General, to urge abandonment of the per se
rule for resale price maintenance. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
135. Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977); see supra notes
110-18 and accompanying text.
136. The "free rider" problem is explained by H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, at 252-58,
who asserts that "[m]ost instances of RPM or vertical territorial division" can be explained as
an attempt "to avoid one of the many variations of the 'free rider' problem." Id. at 252.
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ket coverage.137 In light of these arguments, the Court refused to
maintain a blanket condemnation of such practices.
Similar arguments can be made concerning resale price mainte-
nance. Competition from discount dealers may act as a disincentive to
dealer advertising, the provision of services, or other investments in the
goodwill of a particular brand. Freedom from intrabrand price competi-
tion might also be used to recruit dealers for a new product, or one with a
weak market position.138 Other reasons for resale price maintenance,
apart from any intention to monopolize, have also been suggested, such
as a manufacturer's desire to maintain a "prestige image" for its
product. 139
Although an occasional commentator has argued that the distinc-
tion between resale price maintenance and other vertical restraints can be
supported and that vertical price restraints should therefore be viewed
with suspicion, 140 most are of the view that this inconsistency cannot be
justified, at least not upon neoclassical microeconomic premises.1 41 Most
of those who have recognized the conflict have called for the abolition of
per se categorization of resale price maintenance.142 Few commentators
advocate resolving the conflict by returning nonprice vertical restrictions
to per se status, although some do advocate the use of a limited per se
rule. This limited rule would be invoked only against restraints imposed
by firms with a significant market share, or perhaps only against the most
dangerous of vertical nonprice restraints, strict assignment of territories
or customers.143 At the other extreme, some have argued that not only
are all types of vertical restraints often procompetitive, but they are bene-
ficial in the overwhelming majority of cases. Therefore, according to this
line of thought, not only are such restraints inappropriate subjects for per
137. See supra note 116.
138. See generally H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, at 247-58.
139. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 18, at 384.
140. See Gerhart, The "Competitive Advantages" Explanation for Intrabrand Restraints.
An Antitrust Analysis, 1981 DUKE L.J. 417. The argument is that even with fixed retail prices,
dealers may try to offer attractive, but low-cost, services to consumers, and take a free ride on
other dealers who are providing those services that the manufacturer actually wants provided.
See also Pitofsky, supra note 132.
141. The division between "price" and "nonprice" restraints is, of course, somewhat artifi-
cial. 'Nonprice" restrictions will not only have an impact on price, but are often intended to
eliminate discount competition. See Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-
Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1978).
142. E.g., Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Syl-
vania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1977).
143. This distinction between Sylvania and Schwinn was initially pointed to by the Ninth
Circuit and was adopted by Justice White in his concurring opinion in Sylvania. 433 U.S. at
60-63 (White, J., concurring).
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se illegality, they should actually be declared per se legal.144
None of these positions has been accepted by the courts, possibly
due to the apparent intent of Congress to maintain strict sanctions
against resale price maintenance.145 However, if antitrust theorists con-
tinue to criticize the anomaly of treating only one form of vertical re-
straint as per se illegal, the most likely way this conflict will be resolved is
by the Supreme Court reversing its position on vertical price fixing. With
respect to tying arrangements, legislative support of unwavering prohibi-
tion is less recent, if not less clear, and the Court has already come close
to abandoning the per se concept. Four Justices already support rule of
reason treatment for such practices. 146 Given the likely changes in the
composition of the Court in the near future, rule of reason analysis may
be adopted as the test for tying arrangements as well as other vertical
.restraints. 14
7
Less attention has been paid in recent literature to per se rules in-
volving boycotts and -horizontal market division. With respect to boy-
cotts, this sanguinity may reflect the perception that the surviving per se
rule is so limited that it has relatively little impact on antitrust enforce-
ment.148 Few significant cases have involved horizontal market division,
unaccompanied by price fixing, since the unambiguous classification of
such practices as per se illegal in 1972.149 Still, some have criticized the
application of per se rules in these cases. Topco remains, in the view of
some, a classic example of how horizontal market division can occasion-
ally have procompetitive results.' 50
Only with respect to the classic per se offense, horizontal price fix-
ing, has criticism been rare. Nevertheless, an occasional voice has been
raised to argue that per se analysis should be abandoned even with re-
144. See Posner, supra note 98, at 22-26.
145. The 1975 repeal of the Miller-Tydings Act and the McGuire Act is one indication of
legislative hostility to resale price maintenance. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
146. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 32-47 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring); see supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
147. The two most prominent critics of per se treatment for vertical restraints, Judges
Robert Bork and Richard Posner, are among the most frequently mentioned potential nomi-
nees to any further Supreme Court vacancy during the Reagan Administration. See, e.g..
Dworkin, Reagan 's Justice, 31 N.Y. Rev. of Books, Nov. 8, 1984, at 27; The Next Nominee?, 7
Nat'l L.J., Nov. 26, 1984, at 1, col. 2.
148. See supra notes 119-25 and accompanying text.
149. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608-10 (1972); see supra notes 35-39
and accompanying text.
150. "Unlike horizontal interbrand restraints subject to the per se rule, these 'horizontal'
restraints were primarily intrabrand restraints and were ancillary to the integration of grocery
stores in a joint buying agency, providing a justification that should have taken the restraints
out of the per se rule." Gerhart, supra note 86, at 325-26.
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spect to this "hard core" Sherman Act violation. 151 Although there is
little reason to believe that courts will seriously reconsider the designa-
tion of horizontal price fixing as per se illegal, the mere existence of such
arguments indicates the strength of the movement against per se analysis.
Even when criticism of per se rules does not lead to their explicit aban-
donment, it helps to create an atmosphere in which the surviving per se
rules are continually narrowed through judicial circumscription. The ex-
panded use of the rule of reason leads, then, to more permissive judicial
treatment for those types of conduct once treated as clearly anti-
competitive. 1
52
Of course, the critics of per se analysis have not had the field entirely
to themselves. Those advocating strict application of the Sherman and
Clayton Acts have counterattacked, putting forward both relatively nar-
row defenses of particular per se rulest 53 and broad defenses of the con-
cept of per se illegality.' 54 Some advocates of broad application of per se
rules argue that economic efficiency is the dominant goal of antitrust
analysis and attempt to demonstrate that efficiency is not promoted by
practices traditionally labelled per se illegal.' 55 Others contend that effi-
ciency must yield to, or at least share the spotlight with, other values that
call for strict application of antitrust prohibitions even in the face of pos-
sible efficiency losses from such enforcement. 156
It is not surprising that defenders of the per se concept are losing
ground, both in the academic literature and in the courts. This situation,
however, is much less a reflection of any defect in the general position
advocating vigorous antitrust enforcement than an indication of a funda-
mental flaw in the concept chosen to implement that position. From the
earliest days of antitrust, advocates of vigorous enforcement have made
strong and appealing arguments for listing certain types of conduct as
151. E.g., Note, supra note 16.
152. The Vertical Restraint Guidelines, issued by the Justice Department in January 1985,
illustrate the advance of permissive attitudes. Reacting to Sylvania, which held that vertical
restraints may promote competition, the Department has declared that "vertical restraints
generally have a procompetitive or competitively neutral effect." Department of Justice, Anti-
trust Division, Vertical Restraints Guidelines § 3.2, 50 Fed. Reg. 6263, 6267 (1985). Thus, a
judicial declaration that a practice is not always illegal quickly becomes an enforcement policy
under which that practice is presumed to be legal.
153. See e.g., Pitofsky, supra note 132 (defending per se treatment of resale price
maintenance).
154. See, e.g., Redlich, supra note 132.
155. See. e.g.. Louis, Vertical Distribution Restraints After Sylvania: A Postscript and Coin-
ment, 76 Micii. L. Rnv. 265 (1977) (criticizing Sylvania for not recognizing that some non-
price vertical restraints are more anticompetitive than others).
156. See. e.g.. Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines. What Are the
Sources o1 Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L. RiV. 1214 (1977).
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clearly and invariably forbidden. 57 Not only would this categorization
make enforcement of the antitrust laws quicker and more certain, it
would also serve to deter far more anticompetitive behavior. Certainty
and judicial economy are no doubt valid concerns, and vigorous enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws is certainly consistent with the spirit of the
public and the legislators who adopted them.
158
But the use of the concept of per se illegality has been unfortunate.
To the extent that the term means what it says-that certain practices
will invariably be illegal-it is difficult to defend. If a practice is to be
classified as invariably illegal, it should be so designated only upon a
showing that it will always (or at least almost always) cause harm out-
weighing any benefits which it may produce. Some courts have so held,
stating that the per se label will be reserved for practices which will al-
ways, or almost always, fail the standard test of antitrust analysis, the
rule of reason. 159
Absolutes, however, even when qualified with the word "almost,"
are hard to prove. In an area as complex as the effect of concerted busi-
ness practices on coml3etition, numerous counterexamples, both hypo-
thetical and actual, may be advanced to rebut the contention that any
such practice invariably injures competition. To defend per se illegality,
then, is to defend something almost inevitably indefensible. The only
possible way to defend the concept effectively is to resort to the course
currently being taken by the Supreme Court: to narrow the categories so
far as to make the question of categorization almost as complex as full
rule of reason analysis. At that point, the defense of the per se concept
becomes merely an exercise in semantics.
If the concept of per se illegality is indefensible, except when so re-
fined as to make it largely irrelevant, why continue to defend it at all?
Why not simply abandon the field to the rule of reason? It seems clear
that the battle over the per se rules is less a clash over those specific rules
than a battle over basic attitudes toward antitrust enforcement. For bet-
ter or worse, per se rules have become linked in most minds with vigor-
ous enforcement; to favor one is to favor the other. The rule of reason,
on the other hand, is associated with a tolerant attitude toward antitrust
defendants. Rule of reason analysis often-perhaps usually-leads to a
157. This was largely the motivation behind the adoption of the Clayton Act ill 1914. See
supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
158. See A. WAILKER, supra note 4.
159. When there is insufficient evidence to make such a finding of invariable anticompeti-
tive effect, per se treatment is rejected. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253
(1963).
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finding of no liability. Its complexity and uncertainty can deter plaintiffs
from even attempting to challenge behavior which many would say
should be challenged. Since, to so many, rule of reason analysis means a
type of antitrust enforcement under which much anticompetitive activity
will be permitted, per se analysis is defended, not so much for its own
virtues, but rather because of fears of the permissive nature of its sole
obvious rival.
An alternative system of antitrust analysis would ideally avoid the
indefensible and ultimately self-defeating absolutes of per se analysis, yet
also avoid such complexity and uncertainty that harmful or suspect busi-
ness activities would go unchallenged. Once formulated, such an alterna-
tive should be embraced by advocates of vigorous antitrust enforcement.
Although some may be reluctant to abandon a concept such as per se
illegality which has been defended for so long, if its defense is clearly
doomed to failure by inherent flaws in the concept, the battle lines should
be drawn around a new perimeter not only capable of being defended,
but also worth defending.
III. Strict Antitrust Scrutiny as an Alternative
to Per Se Analysis
The need for an alternative approach to classic per se analysis which
does not merely return to the permissiveness of the rule of reason has led
to some interesting suggestions. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has
created a third test for use in Sherman Act cases. Less stringent than the
per se rule, but less permissive than the rule of reason, the standard is
called "facial unreasonableness."
The Fifth Circuit enunciated this test in United States v. Realty
Multi-List, Inc. 160 Membership criteria maintained by a multiple listing
service of real estate brokers were challenged as an illegal boycott. 161
The court held that the practices did not fall into the per se boycott cate-
gory. In light of recent Supreme Court precedent, the court held that per
se treatment must be reserved for practices which clearly lack "the possi-
bility of any joint, efficiency-producing economic activities." 162 Since the
160. 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980).
161. From the formation ofRML... its by-laws required an applicant for admission
to hold a real estate broker's license in the state of Georgia, to agree to abide by all
RML's internal rules, to receive the favorable recommendation of RML's member-
ship committee after it investigated his or her application, to receive an 85% affirina-
tive vote from RML's active members, and to purchase a share of RML stock.
Id. at 1358 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
162. Id. at 1364.
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maintenance of multiple listing services served obvious procompetitive
purposes, and since some membership restrictions could be reasonably
ancillary to those purposes, the court found per se treatment in-
appropriate. 1
63
The alternative the court adopted was not merely the unfocused and
possibly too permissive rule of reason, but rather an intermediate type of
analysis forged, said the court, out of the inherent flexibility of that rule.
The court stated that application of its "facial unreasonableness" test
would "void on its face any significantly restrictive rule of a combination
or trade association with significant market power, which lacks competi-
tive justification or whose reach clearly exceeds the combination's legiti-
mate needs."
164
Without requiring the delineation of specific types of practices previ-
ously demonstrated to be per se illegal, the facial unreasonableness test
applies when a plaintiff shows two things: a rule of a combination or
trade association which is significantly restrictive165 and the existence of
"significant" market power.1 6 6 Defendants then must demonstrate a
competitive justification for the rule and show that the rule is narrowly
tailored to satisfy that purpose.' 67 If a plaintiff carries his burden and the
163. The court reasoned:
By serving as a central processing and distributing point for listings of real estate,
RML helps reduce "information and communication barriers" and ease "the built-in
geographical barrier confronting buyer and seller."... It aids the seller by allowing
him to give an exclusive listing to a broker, and thus to choose the agent with whom
he prefers to deal, while nevertheless enabling him to place his listing in the hands of
all RML's members to attempt to procure a buyer.... The buyer benefits by gaining
access to a wider selection of properties in a shorter time period than would be the
case if he engaged a lone broker.
Id. at 1368.
164. Id. at 1370. The recently created Eleventh Circuit also applies this test. The new
circuit adopted as precedent all cases decided before October 1, 1981 by the Fifth Circuit, from
which the Eleventh Circuit had been split. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206
(11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
165. "First, one can access [sic] the degree to which the association is involved in the
actual business activities of its members. The more directly the association is involved in its
member's business, the more likely it is that exclusion from membership will produce concrete
anticompetitive effects." Realty Multi-List, 629 F.2d at 1370.
166. In explaining what it meant by "significant" market power, the court stated:
We do not set strict mathematical standards regarding the level of market power
which must be shown; in any given case, the question whether the association has the
requisite power may turn on a number of different factors .... At the least, when
broker participation is high, the service itself is economically successful and competi-
tion from other listing services is lacking, rules which invite the unjustified exclusion
of any broker should be found unreasonable.
Id. at 1373-74.
167. See id. at 1374-85.
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defendant fails to carry his, the practice is invalidated as "facially
unreasonable."
Because the "facial unreasonableness" analysis requires that the
purpose of the agreement be examined and the market power of the de-
fendants assessed, one might question whether the test really differs from
the rule of reason. The primary difference appears to be the way in
which the test allocates burdens of proof, a factor of great importance
when dealing with matters as unclear as those presented for adjudication
in antitrust cases.
Professor John Flynn has argued that the proper way to view per se
and rule of reason analysis is not as two types of rules applicable to differ-
ent types of conduct, but rather as ways of "generating differing eviden-
tiary presumptions for allocating burdens of proof." 168 Professor Flynn
points out what is now quite clear, that even in cases in which per se
analysis is found appropriate, an "extended evidentiary inquiry" involv-
ing the purpose and overall effect of the challenged practice, as well as
the market power of the defendants, is likely to take place. The real
question is at what point the inquiry will begin, and how burdens of
proof should be allocated during the inquiry.
169
Rather than beginning antitrust analysis by demanding a yes or no
answer to the question of whether the practice at issue is one of those
always forbidden, Professor Flynn would ask, "What facts will give rise
to a presumption of illegality, how conclusive is the presumption, and
what circumstances, if any, will justify permitting a rebuttal of the pre-
sumption?" 170 When an analysis of the practice shows it to be the type
which historically has proven to threaten competition, such as price fix-
ing or horizontal market division, 171 per se categorization should lead to
a "nearly conclusive" presumption of illegality. 172 In cases involving
types of conduct less clearly anticompetitive, such as vertical nonprice
168. Flynn, Rethinking Sherman Act Section 1 Analysis: Three Proposals for Reducing the
Chaos, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 1593, 1609 (1982).
169. Id. at 1608-19.
170. Id. at 1613.
171. See supra notes 19-39 and accompanying text.
172. Flynn, supra note 168, at 1615. Professor Flynn explains:
The more central the goal being displaced . . . the more likely a presumption of
illegality and the more conclusive the presumption. The less clear the goals of anti-
trust policy involved or the more confused anticompetitive effects become with
procompetitive effects ... the less conclusive the presumption allocating burdens of
proof. Where no immediate impact on the goals of antitrust policy is perceived, no




restrictions, 173 per se analysis would mean "[l]ower levels of presumptive
illegality."' 174 In every case, per se categorization and analysis would be
a way of shifting the burden of proof to the defendant to justify his ac-
tions, rather than a way of putting an absolute end to the ability of the
defendant to do so.
Both Professor Flynn's approach to per se analysis and the "facial
unreasonableness" test of the Fifth Circuit take into account the enor-
mous difficulty, if not futility, of attempting to label any particular prac-
tice as always anticompetitive. Each also retains, however, the label "per
se." The Fifth Circuit's new test is meant not to displace, but to supple-
ment per se analysis. 75 Professor Flynn retains the term, but would
change its meaning, if not from the way courts actually treat it, at least
from the way in which most people think of it.
Why retain a term when it must be either redefined so drastically
that it bears almost no resemblance to its commonly understood mean-
ing, or defined so narrowly that it will hardly ever be used? The best
answer may lie less in logic than in what might be called antitrust psy-
chology. As discussed above, the term "per se" has become almost sy-
nonymous with serious antitrust enforcement; the rule of reason test has
become associated with leniency. The argument over labels, then, is per-
haps more understandable when seen as a battle over general attitudes
toward antitrust enforcement. Those favoring rigorous enforcement can-
not, and should not, be expected to give up the concept of per se illegality
if the alternative is a standard which will be perceived as a step toward
abandoning serious efforts to enforce the law.
If the concept of per se illegality is to be replaced, the alternative
must clearly convey the notion that certain practices are highly suspect
and will be subjected to close inspection. Any shift in terminology must
be a clarification, not a loosening, of antitrust standards. At the same
time, the substance of the new standard should incorporate the insights
developed by those who have already suggested different ways of looking
at per se analysis. Professor Flynn is correct when he argues that the
173. See supra notes 110-18 and accompanying text.
174. Flynn, supra note 168, at 1616 ("While Schwinn may have created too rigid a pre-
sumption of illegality, Sylvania appears to have gone to the opposite extreme and created too
rigid a presumption of legality ....").
175. Thus, in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, in a case involving the activities of a joint
venture or association of competitors, the court will consider the question of whether to label
defendants' activity as per se illegal, and then, if deciding against such classification, will con-
sider applying the facial unreasonableness test as an alternative. See, e.g., National Bancard
Corp. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1231 (S.D. Fla. 1984), aff'd, 779 F.2d 592 (11th Cir.
1986).
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difference between types of antitrust conduct should be seen as a matter
of presumptions and burdens of proof. The Fifth Circuit is also correct
when it recognizes the need for a test more stringent than rule of reason
analysis, yet without the self-defeating absolutism inherent in the concept
of per se illegality. As long as the term "per se" is retained, however,
these insights are unlikely to prevail. Rather, the battle will continue
between those defending an unrealistically stringent concept for fear of
sending a too permissive message by abandoning it, and those who desire
to send precisely such a message.
There is, however, a term and a framework for analysis which can
very profitably be applied to antitrust. It quite accurately reflects what
per se analysis has become, that is, a system of presumptions and burdens
of proof rather than a checklist of easily identified absolute prohibitions.
At the same time, it clearly conveys the message that the test being ap-
plied is a stringent one, a standard significantly more burdensome to de-
fendants than the rule of reason. That term, found most frequently in the
area of constitutional law, is strict scrutiny. 176
In the assessment of constitutional issues of due process and equal
protection, the Supreme Court has designated certain governmental
practices and classifications as subject to this test. Practices or classifica-
tions are subject to strict scrutiny not because they are "always" illegal,
but rather because history and the goals of the Constitution indicate that
they are particularly suspect. 177 Generally, a government practice sub-
ject to strict scrutiny may be justified only by demonstrating that it is
necessary to achieve a "compelling state interest" and is narrowly tai-
lored to achieve that goal, going no further than necessary. 178
In constitutional litigation, strict scrutiny usually, but not always, 179
results in the invalidation of the governmental practice in question. The
alternative constitutional test, referred to as "ordinary scrutiny" or the
"rational basis" test, requires only that the practice in question be ration-
ally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. As might be expected,
under this latter test the challenged practice usually, but not always, 180
176. See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 591-96
(2d ed. 1983).
177. The classic example, of course, is the use of race or national origin to classify a group
for disadvantageous treatment. Id. at 592.
178. Id. at 591-93.
179. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (upholding executive order
requiring the exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry from the city of San Leandro). Ironi-
cally, Korematsu was the case which first clearly set forth the idea of strict scrutiny of statutes
aimed at a "suspect" classification.
180. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3254-60 (1985)
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survives constitutional attack. While the shifts in presumptions and bur-
dens heavily influence outcomes, neither test purports to be absolute.
Practices subject to strict scrutiny need not be proven to be always
unjustifiable.
Strict antitrust scrutiny would yield much the same result. When
history shows that a practice is usually anticompetitive, the courts would
declare the practice subject to strict scrutiny. The burden would then be
on the defendant to demonstrate: (a) that the practice was adopted in
pursuance of a procompetitive object 18' and (b) that the practice is no
more restrictive than necessary to achieve that procompetitive purpose.
It can be anticipated that, as in the case of strict constitutional scrutiny,
strict antitrust scrutiny will usually lead to invalidation of the challenged
practice; however, antitrust theorists need not be enormously disturbed
when a particular practice survives a challenge, since all cases will be
scrutinized on their particular facts, and only justifiable practices will be
upheld. Unlike the concept of per se illegality, strict antitrust scrutiny is
compatible with the notion that absolute prohibitions may not be
defensible.
Yet the test is sufficiently severe, and the terminology sufficiently
indicative of that severity, that this recasting of the way in which particu-
larly suspect practices are treated under the antitrust laws should not be
seen as a wholesale retreat in antitrust enforcement. Indeed, the ultimate
result of a change in both terminology and analysis should be to promote
rigorous enforcement. Advocates of strict antitrust scrutiny should have
an easier task persuading courts to apply the test than advocates of tradi-
tional per se analysis. Simple demonstration that certain practices, 'either
actual or theoretical, would fall into the same category as those at issue
and would yield procompetitive outcomes will be insufficient to avoid
strict scrutiny.
Recent court decisions and scholarly criticism have made obvious
the fact that the search for antitrust absolutes is not only futile, but also
counterproductive when the alternative to per se absolutism is the per-
missiveness of the rule of reason. Antitrust law should therefore abandon
the terminology of per se violations, yet retain the essential insight that
certain practices are highly suspect. This can be done most effectively by
(striking down zoning ordinance, as applied, requiring special permit for home for mentally
retarded persons).
181. The effect of a challenged practice on competition, rather than on more broadly de-
fined aspects of public welfare, is the appropriate question in antitrust litigation, at least where
Congress has not clearly enunciated some other goal to be weighed against competition. See
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978).
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substituting for the per se concept the idea of strict antitrust scrutiny.
Suspect practices subjected to this test will be judged, not under the stan-
dard rule of reason, which compels plaintiffs to demonstrate that the par-
ticular practice is, in the particular case, anticompetitive, but rather
under a test which compels the defendant to bear the burden of justifying
the practice.
IV. Applying Strict Antitrust Scrutiny
Not only is it possible to adhere to the principle that certain types of
behavior deserve more careful antitrust treatment than is provided by
normal rule of reason analysis without defending the position that such
behavior must always be declared illegal, it is also preferable to the clas-
sic per se approach. The application of strict antitrust scrutiny will be
harsh enough to discourage anticompetitive behavior, flexible enough to
allow justifiable behavior which may superficially resemble anticompeti-
tive behavior, and clear enough to promote better understanding and
communication among those involved in antitrust enforcement.
Initially, a court must determine whether the behavior in question is
of a type that deserves strict antitrust scrutiny. Such strict scrutiny
should be applied when the practice in question has been shown to be
dangerous to competition in a clear majority of cases. It need not be
demonstrated, however, that the practice always, or even almost always,
will fail the rule of reason. Thus, the production of one procompetitive
counterexample, real or theoretical, will not be enough to invalidate the
rule. Those types of behavior subject to strict antitrust scrutiny should,
of course, largely be those categories now designated per se illegal. Strict
antitrust scrutiny, while making the initial question of categorization less
crucial than it is under per se analysis, will not eliminate the need for
initial categorization.
Strict antitrust scrutiny should be applied to the following practices:
(1) Horizontal Price Fixing
This practice is, of course, traditionally considered the most suspect
of all concerted anticompetitive behavior. Still, as demonstrated in
Broadcast Music, it might occasionally be justified.' 82 If, rather than in-
evitably declaring a particular practice illegal after its classification as
price fixing, a court allows the defendant to attempt the difficult task of
justification, the court need not narrow the category itself, as the
182. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1979); see
supra notes 69-79 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court did in Broadcast Music. To classify behavior as price
fixing for purposes of determining whether to apply strict antitrust scru-
tiny, courts should simply inquire whether the defendants intended to,
and did, raise, lower, fix, or stabilize a price.183 Whether that act was an
end in itself or a means of achieving legitimate goals is a question to be
raised in the application of the strict scrutiny test, rather than in deciding
whether or not the test should be applied.
Once the court determines a practice is subject to strict scrutiny, the
application of the test will resemble the analysis in the two most signifi-
cant recent cases involving horizontal price fixing, Broadcast Music and
Maricopa. 84 Although difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile under
current antitrust thinking, these cases are not inconsistent when viewed
through the lens of strict antitrust scrutiny. In each case, defendants
intended to and did in fact fix prices, in the literal sense of the words. At
this initial stage of the analysis, rather than analyzing motives, the Court
could simply have declared that the behavior in each case would be sub-
ject to strict antitrust scrutiny.
The defendants in Broadcast Music were able to clearly demonstrate
that their price-fixing activity was narrowly tailored to serve the procom-
petitive purposes of maintaining the value of copyrights. 8 5 Thus, the
defendants successfully bore their strict scrutiny burden. The Court's
holding, that illegality should be found, if at all, only pursuant to a rule
of reason, should not have been based upon the claim that the defend-
ants' behavior was not price fixing, but that it was, under the strict scru-
tiny test, justifiable price fixing. In Maricopa, on the other hand, the
physicians were not able to bear the same burden. Central to the Court's
opinion were the Court's doubts as to whether the physicians' insurance
plan was the least restrictive way of achieving whatever legitimate econo-
mies were claimed to be the goals of the program.18 6
Under currently enunciated tests of per se illegality, it would appear
that Maricopa and Broadcast Music are inconsistent. In each case, the
defendants showed a distinct possibility of procompetitive effects. If per
se categorization requires a showing of near certain anticompetitive ef-
fects, then neither practice qualifies. But the history of the practice, the
need for the practice, and the benefits to be gained were much clearer in
Broadcast Music. In Maricopa, despite some evidence of procompetitive
183. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940); supra notes
19-22 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 69-89 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 85.
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effects, the strict scrutiny burden was not sustained. This analysis of
Broadcast Music and Maricopa indicates that strict antitrust scrutiny
may not change the outcome in many cases. It would, however, better
describe the reasons those outcomes occur and thus provide a sounder
basis for future decisions.
(2) Vertical Price Fixing
The reasons currently cited for classifying vertical price fixing as per
se illegal support its classification as conduct subject to strict antitrust
scrutiny. By definition, vertical price fixing reduces intrabrand competi-
tion, and its overall effect will often be anticompetitive. 1 7 However,
even those sympathetic to the current per se illegal status of resale price
maintenance should recognize that the absolutist position that such ac-
tivity is always anticompetitive is untenable. Still, both precedent and
legislative intent support stringent treatment of vertical price restraints.
In addition, evidence shows that such practices may not be very efficient
means of achieving the legitimate goals that supposedly lead manufactur-
ers and suppliers to engage in such conduct.18 8 Strict antitrust scrutiny is
the best way to resolve this dilemma.
Whether a particular practice constitutes resale price maintenance
can be established under current tests.18 9 Again, any argument in justifi-
cation of the practice should not arise until it has been decided that the
strict scrutiny test is appropriate. Once vertical price restraints have been
shown to exist, the defendants should be allowed to justify the practice
by showing that it is narrowly tailored to attain demonstrated procompe-
titive ends. Defendants, however, would have the burden of proof, and it
is quite likely that they will often fail to carry it. This prediction gains
support from the fact that resale price maintenance is often a far less
direct or efficient way of inducing procompetitive dealer conduct than
other available courses. Some have suggested that a manufacturer's
methods of increasing interbrand competition should not be second-
guessed, and that once such motives are established, the practice should
be condoned.1 90 But this "manufacturer knows best" philosophy is sim-
187. See generally Pitofsky, supra note 132, at 1490-91.
188. See id. at 1493 ("In any event, there are far more appropriate and less restrictive
methods of insuring the availability of services. If a manufacturer really wants additional
advertising, the common commercial practice is to contract separately for it.").
189. The most troublesome point is often whether there has been an agreement or merely
unilateral action protected by the Colgate doctrine. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying
text.
190. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 98, at 23 ("[E]conomic theory ... teaches that a manu-
facturer will (unilaterally) restrict distribution only in order to be more competitive.").
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ply inconsistent with the basic skepticism toward collusive practices
which is at the heart of the antitrust laws. Although the absolute
prohibitions of the per se rule may be inappropriate for vertical price
restraints, the alternative should not be rule of reason permissiveness, 191
but rather the rebuttable skepticism of strict antitrust scrutiny.
(3) Horizontal Market Division
Clearly, division of markets among competitors is as anticompeti-
tive, and quite possibly more so, than horizontal price fixing. In its more
rigid forms, such as airtight territorial restraints or outright assignment
of customers, this type of behavior eliminates all forms of competition
between the parties, while price fixing by definition eliminates only price
competition.192 Yet in certain situations procompetitive effects may re-
sult from some form of market division scheme, as was evident in Topco,
the case in which such practices were first unambiguously labelled per se
violations. 193
But Topco also demonstrates the wisdom of the approach of strict
antitrust scrutiny. While using per se language, the courts disposed of
the Topco agreement as if they were dealing with a strict scrutiny case.
After the rigid territorial agreements of the initial Topco arrangement
were invalidated, Topco adopted a less restrictive system of "areas of
primary responsibility" enforced by "profit pass-over" provisions. 1
94
These less restrictive means of attaining an efficient system of marketing
house brand products to compete with national supermarket chains were
upheld. 19
5
In other words, Topco initially failed the strict scrutiny test. The
company admittedly engaged in horizontal market division and,
although it was able to articulate a plausible procompetitive purpose, was
191. Use of the rule of reason in cases involving vertical nonprice restraints has been ex-
tremely permissive. See id. at 22 ("In no case . . . when courts have required or at least
permitted a deeper exploration of the facts than in the Schwinn era of per se illegality, has a
purely vertical restriction on competition been shown to be anticompetitive.") (emphasis in
original).
192. See generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note 18, at 224-29.
193. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
194. Generally, these restrictions require a dealer to exert certain efforts and provide ad-
vertising or services within a designated territory, and while they allow other dealers to sell in
that territory, the outside dealer who makes such a sale must compensate the dealer who has
responsibility for the territory for part of his advertising or service costs. See Department of
Justice, Antitrust Division, Vertical Restraint Guidelines § 2.5, 50 Fed. Reg. 6263, 6266
(1985).
195. United States v. Topco Assocs., 1973-1 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 74,485 (N.D. Ill.),
aff'd per curiam, 414 U.S. 801 (1973).
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unable to demonstrate that a restraint as severe as rigid territorial restric-
tions was necessary to enable the cooperative purchasing program to
flourish. The revised Topco agreement, however, could be defended as
narrowly tailored to achieve its procompetitive ends and therefore sur-
vive the test of strict antitrust scrutiny.
Courts and commentators have drawn distinctions among different
types of market division practices. Rigid territorial divisions or the spe-
cific assignment of customers are the most dangerous to competition. It
can be anticipated that under a regime of strict scrutiny, such horizontal
practices would rarely be found to be sufficiently narrow to survive. On
the other hand, such devices as the typical "area of primary responsibil-
ity" provisions are sufficiently narrow to be easily defended under such a
test. In fact, it may be desirable to limit strict antitrust scrutiny in this
context to territorial or customer divisions, and to adopt rule of reason
treatment for less rigid systems. But unlike per se analysis, the bounda-
ries of the category are less critical than the inquiry which follows the
classification. As is the case with price fixing, strict scrutiny as applied to
horizontal market division would enable courts to apply stringent stan-
dards of analysis when appropriate, without foreclosing legitimate justifi-
catory arguments.
(4) Vertical Market Restraints
In the context of vertical market restraints, adoption of strict anti-
trust scrutiny cannot be taken to be an endorsement of permissiveness.
The problems inherent in per se absolutism have already caused its de-
mise with respect to these restraints, and the alternative of full rule of
reason treatment has been adopted. 196 This circumstance should not,
however, exempt all such restraints from strict antitrust scrutiny. It is
arguable that the Supreme Court's choice of rule of reason treatment in
GTE Sylvania was largely the consequence of the perceived existence of
only two alternatives: per se analysis or application of the rule of reason.
As is true with horizontal restraints, an effective system of vertical
market division will eliminate competition between the participants to a
greater extent than a similar system of price fixing. 19 7 On the other
hand, it can be argued that this effect is balanced, if not outweighed, by
the close relation of at least some types of market division to arguably
procompetitive goals. The existence of exclusive territories, for example,
may spur dealer advertising, since the dealer can be confident that he will
196. See supra notes 110-18 and accompanying text.
197. See generally L. SULI..VAN, supra note 18, at 224-29.
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reap all of its benefits within his territory.198
But the fact that these restraints may be more closely related to ar-
guably procompetitive goals than is resale price maintenance does not
lead to the conclusion that they should automatically be given permissive
rule of reason treatment. Rather, as is true with horizontal market divi-
sion, strict antitrust scrutiny should be applied. This standard will allow
manufacturers the opportunity to adopt demonstrably procompetitive
vertical distribution systems while not going so far as to permit overly
restrictive schemes. A manufacturer will have the burden of demonstrat-
ing that his system of vertical restraints is narrowly tailored to achieving
an increase in intrabrand competition. As noted with respect to horizon-
tal market divisions, it may be wise to designate only the most restrictive
of these practices-strict territorial limitations and customer assign-
ments-as subject to strict antitrust scrutiny. Arrangements less restric-
tive of intrabrand competition, such as the designation of areas of
primary responsibility and the use of profit pass-over provisions, would
be subject to the rule of reason. 199 Such a set of rules would permit the
use of vertical marketing techniques helpful to manufacturers' legitimate
interests, yet strongly steer manufacturers away from using such interests
to mask attempts to achieve anticompetitive goals through the use of
overly restrictive means.
(5) Boycotts
Per se analysis has been used to invalidate a boycott only when the
boycott has been directed against a competitor of at least one of the con-
spirators, and when the boycott seeks to cut its victim off from valuable
trade relationships.200 Strict antitrust scrutiny would change little, ex-
cept terminology, in the antitrust analysis of those practices. Courts
have already suggested that even boycotts meeting the normal per se cri-
teria may be justifiable if narrowly tailored to achieve legitimate ends.20'
Adoption of the rule of strict antitrust scrutiny would make this sugges-
198. See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, at 248-58.
199. Justice White, concurring in Sylvania, argued that some, but not all, vertical restric-
tions should receive per se treatment. 433 U.S. at 59-63 (White, J., concurring).
200. See supra notes 43-46 & 119-25 and accompanying text.
201. In Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961), the
Court found that an association's refusal to give its "seal of approval" to a competitor's gas
burner would be an illegal boycott when the denial of the seal was not based upon genuine,
objective concerns with the safety of the product. The implication is clear that if the denial
was the result of objective safety concerns, then it might be permitted, despite the fact that its
effect would still be to deprive a competitor of a valuable trade relationship. See also Eliason
Corp. v. National Sanitation Found., 614 F.2d 126, 128-31 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
826 (1980).
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As discussed above, 20 3 the per se rule with respect to tying arrange-
ments is unique. Since some degree of market power in the tying product
is an element of the offense, per se analysis with respect to tying arrange-
ments has always been somewhat difficult to distinguish from application
of the rule of reason. 2°4 Adoption of the test of strict antitrust scrutiny
would put an end to the war over semantics and establish that any coer-
cive tying of products must be narrowly tailored to a procompetitive end.
As has been noted in current law, coercion, which is at the heart of
the offense, must be demonstrated at the outset. Market power is a con-
venient indicator of coercion, though not the only one.20 5 With the
choice no longer between absolute illegality and permissive rule of reason
analysis, but rather between the latter and strict scrutiny, courts need not
strain to set standards for proof of market power so high. If the finding
of coercion is based upon market share, rather than specific signs of
unique advantage, it will be possible to set the standard for strict scrutiny
at the level of significant, rather than monopolistic, market share. Again,
while the rule will not absolutely bar tying arrangements, even by mo-
nopolists, it will require companies with significant market positions to
take care in adopting such restraints.
Conclusion
Since the earliest days of antitrust enforcement, courts have at-
tempted to deal with the fact that certain types of behavior, on their face,
present more of a threat to competition than others. This has unfortu-
nately led to the development of a concept of per se illegality which ad-
dresses a genuine problem in an unrealistic way. The basic notion of per
se illegality-that some types of behavior can be defined as always, or
almost always, unjustifiable-is far too vulnerable to attack. In a field as
complex as legal regulation of the competitive process, the development
202. See, e.g., Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d
71, 74-80 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970); Deesen v. Professional Golfers Ass'n of
Am., 358 F.2d 165, 170-72 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 846 (1966).
203. See supra notes 47-55 and accompanying text.
204. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 11-16 (1984); supra notes
127-31 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
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of counterexamples to refute any argument with such absolute preten-
sions is too easy.
In response to recent attacks on per se rules, courts have clung to
the term and to its absolutism by steadily narrowing the definitions of the
types of behavior subject to those rules. The result has been not only
much confusion, with words being used to designate things far narrower
than their commonly understood meanings, but also the application of
permissive rule of reason treatment to some behavior which, while not
meriting absolute prohibition, clearly deserves careful antitrust analysis.
The proper response to this confusion is to retain the valid insight of
per se jurisprudence, that certain types of behavior should be treated as
more suspect than others, while abandoning the indefensible absolutism
of the term "per se." However, since terms carry with them not only
precise meanings, but also more general attitudes, "per se" must be re-
placed with a term which does not carry the permissive connotations
which have become associated with the "rule of reason."
The best available term for this new test is strict antitrust scrutiny.
The use of such a term, and the type of analysis it suggests, is well known
in constitutional law, where it by no means is associated with leniency.
When faced with conduct which would traditionally be labelled per se
illegal under the antitrust laws, courts should apply strict antitrust scru-
tiny. They should ask whether the defendant can carry the heavy burden
of demonstrating that its conduct is narrowly tailored to achieve a
procompetitive end. By replacing a system which places absolute
prohibitions on types of conduct which can be defined so narrowly as to
be irrelevant with a system which places, not absolute prohibitions, but
heavy negative presumptions, on a larger set of behaviors, strict scrutiny
should, on the whole, lead to more vigorous antitrust enforcement.
Strict antitrust scrutiny will not result in radical shifts in the out-
come of antitrust cases. Recent per se analysis already contains the seeds
of strict scrutiny. Indeed, strict scrutiny may be a better description of
the reasoning actually underlying these cases than the term "per se."
Little would be lost, apart from semantics, by the change to strict scru-
tiny. What would be gained would be a much more defensible and endur-
ing standard of analysis for those who favor rigorous antitrust
enforcement.
March 1987]

